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Introduction
The dynamics of Chinese politics have changed considerably since the installation of the new 
party and state leadership under Xi Jinping in 2012 and 2013. Decision-making power has shifted 
to newly created central party organs. Political discipline has been enforced through unusually 
intense and sustained campaigns, especially in organisational sectors that are deemed indispen-
sable pillars of Communist Party rule: government bureaucracies, the military, the security organs, 
state-owned enterprises and the media. Military command structures have been thoroughly over-
hauled, uniied and centralised. Economic policies have come to appear less sure-footed than un-
der previous administrations. China’s foreign policy, however, is driven by a multitude of novel 
diplomatic initiatives and more assertive behaviour that has contributed to tense relations with 
many neighbouring countries and the United States.  
WHAT THIS ESSAY COLLECTION IS ABOUT
This essay collection aims at a well-founded and balanced understanding of the rationale and the 
mechanisms that guide top-level decision-making and leadership in today’s China. The agenda 
of this conference is concentrated on China’s national core executive which implies the shifting 
functions, interactions and resources of top-level (supra-ministerial) policy-makers and their sup-
porting organisations that are charged with integrating and inalising central government policies 
and at the same time act as “inal arbiters within the executive of conlicts between diferent 
elements of the government machine” (Dunleavy/Rhodes 1990). 
Core executive leadership can potentially pose a much-needed counterweight against the 
bureaucratic bargaining, particularistic interests and centrifugal forces inherent in every political 
system and also in China’s vast bureaucratic polity. Core executive authority at the same time pos-
es risks of personalised autocratic leadership if collective binding rules of political accommodation 
and decision-making are rejected and abrogated by powerful individual leaders.
This essay collection aims to assess the goals, structures, initiatives, interactions and con-
licts that characterise China’s core executive leadership under Xi Jinping. The contributors ad-
dress ive central issues:
  Goals and visions: What have China’s leaders set out to do?  
What is their vision for the country’s future?
  Initiatives and instruments: What steps does China’s leadership take  
to implement its goals and to what efect?
  Decision-making and political conlict: how do conlicts over power, ideology and policies play 
out and how do we identify political actors and groups that are capable of collective action 
and pressure politics towards or within the core executive?
  Systemic assessment: What do these developments mean for our understanding  
of China’s political system?
  Future perspective: how durable are the initiatives and arrangements  
pursued by the Xi Jinping leadership?
THE THREAT OF ORGANISATIONAL DISINTEGRATION
Western assessments of China’s political development have traditionally tended to focus on a 
progressive transition to a more liberal political order and the conlicts that arise between state 
authority and an emerging civil society in this process. From the perspective of the Chinese par-
Introduction to China’s core executive:
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ty-state, however, it is the progressive deterioration of the organisational hold and internal disci-
pline of the Chinese Communist Party since the 1980s that must be seen as the decisive change 
and catalyst for transformation in the political system of the PRC. While economic transformation 
followed a continued, though selective and restricted, process of opening, deregulation and liber-
alisation, eforts by the central party leadership at reasserting organisational and political disci-
pline have been short-lived and piecemeal at best in the period of high-speed economic transfor-
mation and growth between 1992 and 2012 (see Figure 1). 
During this period of rapid change, decision-making powers in many economic and admin-
istrative realms were delegated to lower levels of government. In addition, informal modes of 
exchange between political and economic players undermined the formal CCP command structure, 
resulting in the emergence of a shadow system of endemic corruption that eluded control by 
party headquarters. China’s political order showed many features of a “fragmented authoritari-
anism” (Lieberthal/Lampton 1992) in which authoritative intervention from the party centre only 
took place during exceptional periods of crisis governance, for instance, in the wake of natural 
catastrophes (e.g. the 2008 Sichuan earthquake), public health epidemics (e.g. SaRS 2003) or 
exogenous economic challenges (e.g. the global inancial and economic crisis 2007–2009). 
Toward the end of the hu-Wen administration (2002–12), China appeared to be entering a 
“post-socialist” political system – one in which changes in the oicial political institutions lagged 
far behind the rapid developments in the economy, society, technology, and, indeed, the global 
environment.
Figure 1
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Introduction
REASSERTING CENTRAL PARTY CONTROL AND TOP-DOWN LEADERSHIP
The Xi-Li administration (since 2012) initiated a pronounced change of direction in terms of China’s 
political development: the party leadership revealed an extraordinary determination to combat 
the previously unstoppable erosion of the party’s internal organisation by launching an extensive 
anti-corruption and discipline campaign. The newly installed leadership began to reinforce the 
Leninist hierarchies of the party-state by concentrating decision-making powers at party head-
quarters – even in those policy areas that had previously been delegated to government organs or 
subnational authorities. General Secretary Xi Jinping made it clear that only the CCP was capable 
of steering the country through the twenty-irst century and that the party would ight vehe-
mently against any attempt to undermine its leadership or to drive the country in the direction of 
a Western-style democratic system. 
In order to rapidly increase “comprehensive national strength”, there was a need to create 
the right political and economic conditions. hence, in 2013 the party leadership launched a struc-
tural reform programme that was designed to avoid the much-feared “middle-income trap” and 
to transform China into one of the world’s most advanced and innovative economic and techno-
logical powers. The programme promised to allow market forces to play a “decisive role” in the 
future development of the economy, meaning liberalisation of the private sector and the inancial 
system, legal security and equal treatment for all types of businesses, reorganisation and partial 
privatisation of state-owned enterprises, and a drastic reduction in state interference in the econ-
omy as a whole. Rigorous application of this reform agenda would indeed have drastic political 
consequences: a comprehensive programme of economic liberalisation would greatly curtail the 
party-state’s capacity to intervene and would come into direct conlict with the interests of the 
established party- and government-backed economic elite. 
as it turned out, by 2016 the 2013 economic liberalisation measures were being implement-
ed inconsistently and selectively. Only piecemeal or marginal restructuring was undertaken in cru-
cial yet politically sensitive areas such as deregulation of state-sector oligopolies, more transpar-
ency in debt management of the iscal and banking systems, establishment of a level playing ield 
for non-state market participants, and improved market access for foreign investors. 
The strengthening of centralised party control over the political and economic system clearly 
was the prerogative of Xi Jinping, who was situated at the helm of power. There was a chance for 
a boost in economic liberalisation only if the party leadership felt it was politically safe to loosen 
controls or if a decline in economic growth posed an immediate threat to CCP rule. During the irst 
several years of Xi Jinping’s tenure, political objectives, such as enforcing domestic discipline and 
pursuing great power diplomacy in combination with military modernisation, took precedence over 
economic restructuring.
XI JINPING’S FORMATIVE EXPERIENCE: HOW HE ATTAINED POWER IN 2012
The manoeuvres, negotiations, and conlicts that occurred in the run-up to naming Xi Jinping as 
general secretary cannot be reconstructed in detail due to the lack of reliable sources. Contra-
dictory rumours and dramatised conspiracy theories are woven around the 2012 personnel deci-
sion-making processes. In any case, there were severe clashes within the party leadership regard-
ing the Bo Xilai case (previously serving as party secretary of Chongqing), whose removal from 
power and subsequent prosecution jeopardised the future of other members of the leadership. 
Delays in decision-making occurred immediately before the 2012 party congress also because Xi 
Jinping insisted on becoming not only party leader and head of state but from the very outset 
becoming chairman of the Central Military Commission as well. Xi Jinping aimed to achieve com-
prehensive authorisation by the former party leadership to halt the CCP’s organisational crisis by 
means of reorganisation and concentration of power in the party leadership system. In any event, 
the change of leadership in 2012 was characterised by lengthy and conlict-ridden intra-party 
negotiations. however, Xi Jinping’s demand for a clear mandate and a concentration of power was 
ultimately realised between 2012 and 2014.
During the irst 
several years 
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“TOP-LEVEL DESIGN” AND AGGRESSIVE LEADERSHIP
The political “top-level design” (顶层设计) introduced with great fanfare under Xi Jinping involves 
a substantial hardening and narrowing of previously much more lexible and exploratory policy 
processes. Xi Jinping prefers centralised decision-making by a small circle of top leaders and trust-
ed advisory staf. Such a decision-making style (top-down “decisionism”) contrasts strikingly with 
the type of policy-making (bottom-up “implementationism”) promoted by Deng Xiaoping and later 
continued by Jiang Zemin. For decades, China’s reform policy had been the result of exploratory 
leadership based on decentralised reform experiments and the speciic lessons learned from im-
plementation of such experimentation. 
Xi Jinping does not actively curtail or prohibit local experimentation. he speaks in favour of 
local experimental zones and pilot initiatives in public statements. But under conditions of con-
centration of power at the top level and in combination with sustained and intense campaigns to 
enforce intra-party discipline, there are no longer any credible and potent incentives to make local 
policy-makers embrace the political risks inherent in bottom-up policy experimentation. 
as a self-assured political leader with the mission of achieving a national “China Dream”, 
Xi relies much less on consultation, exploration and relection in making decisions than did his 
predecessors. his leadership style thus appears much more hierarchical and autocratic than the 
more paternalistic or consultative approaches taken by his predecessors. Xi’s aggressive style of 
decision-making and leadership has become apparent in China’s foreign and security policies, for 
example, with respect to the territorial disputes in the South China Sea. 
LEADERSHIP AND PUBLIC COMMUNICATIONS
In addition to an exceptional concentration of power, a new communication style has also emerged 
under Xi Jinping. not only did Xi make sure to provide memorable photo opportunities that chimed 
with people’s lives (eating in a simple noodle kitchen, etc.), he also endeavoured to use a more live-
ly way of speaking. Xi was the irst Chinese party leader and head of state to initiate a new Year’s 
speech on television, similar in style to the speeches given by Western leaders and heads of state 
or even Russia’s President Putin. Furthermore, he regularly appeared, especially on foreign trips, 
with his photogenic wife, a well-known army folk singer who is a popular igure in China. Overall, 
Xi Jinping introduced a presidential presentation style that was new to Chinese politics, aimed not 
only at reinforcing his own preeminent political position but also at eliciting broader emotional 
support from among the general population. 
POLICY UNCERTAINTY AT THE LOCAL LEVEL
The extent to which the concentration of power at CCP headquarters can be an efective remedy 
for enforcing a nationwide institutional reorganisation over a period of up to ten years under Xi 
Jinping’s leadership remains uncertain. From 2013 to 2016 widespread uncertainty was felt in 
many party and government bodies below the party centre (in the ministries, regional/local admin-
istrations, and companies) regarding whether decentralised initiatives were desirable and could 
be pursued without political risk. This wait-and-see attitude put the brakes on implementation of 
many reforms that had been announced by party headquarters. as a consequence, party leader-
ship organs have resolutely criticised such inactivity by local governments and oicials. 
From 1978 to 2012 decentralised initiatives were crucial in creating an agile and adaptable 
political and economic system. Since 2013, however, the drastic measures undertaken by the par-
ty centre to enforce hierarchical discipline and centralised authority have restricted policy initia-
tive and reform agility at the lower levels of China’s state administration. 
In times of political or economic stress, decentralised policy-making by efective local author-
ities helps to compensate for blockades, political errors, or failed reforms on the part of the cen-
tral government. Yet Xi Jinping’s centralisation of policy initiative is weakening this all-important 
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efect, overcentralised decision-making abolishes the advantages of a system of distributed intel-
ligence and local initiative that Deng Xiaoping had purposefully crafted in the 1980s and 1990s. 
PROSPECTS OF XI’S TOP-DOWN LEADERSHIP
Whether or not the PRC’s decision-making system can continue to be characterised as “fragment-
ed authoritarianism” (a characterisation widely used by China scholars) will depend on the durabil-
ity of the changes that Xi Jinping’s rule has brought to leadership styles, structures and processes. 
In case of serial policy failures and deepening economic problems, it may well turn out to be only a 
temporary centralisation and rigidity. a return to a more exploratory, lexible and deconcentrated 
leadership may become urgently necessary should implementation of the 2013–2020 structur-
al reform programme reach a deadlock. If, however, as the essays in this volume suggest, China 
moves further in the direction of top-down autocratic policy-making, the fragility of the political 
system will most likely increase and the ability to learn from and to correct policy mistakes will 
decrease, rendering the system inlexible and susceptible to sudden disruptions. 
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Part 1: Leadership Styles
Since 1949, China’s top leaders have fallen into two categories: chairmen of the board and CEOs. 
Only the chairmen of the board have put their stamp on China; the CEOs, as their title implies, have 
“simply” kept the country running. Only one leader has attempted to combine both jobs.
THE CHAIRMEN: MAO ZEDONG AND DENG XIAOPING
It is obvious who the chairmen were: Mao Zedong and Deng Xiaoping in the reform era. In Mao’s 
case, the board was, until the Cultural Revolution (CR), the Politburo Standing Committee; there-
after it was the radicals of the Cultural Revolution Group. Until the CR, Liu Shaoqi was a board 
vice-chairman, with the widespread expectation that he was destined for the top job. Mao’s CEO 
was consistently Zhou Enlai till he died, and thereafter Deng till he was purged for the second 
time. One of the most attractive aspects of Zhou to Mao was his loyalty; perhaps Zhou had real-
ised early on that, despite being a brilliant CEO, he did not have the vision for a chairman. On the 
other hand, Mao early on recognised that Deng was a potential chairman, which is why, I assume, 
to the end of his days he refused Jiang Qing’s pleas that Deng be expelled from the CCP.
The picture is complicated because, during and after the Great Leap Forward (GLF), Deng 
and the party secretariat replaced Zhou and the State Council as Mao’s base of operations for 
increasingly ideological ventures like the Socialist Education Movement. In a sense, at that point 
Deng became the chief operating oicer (COO).
MAO: CHAIRMAN AS VISIONARY
Mao’s great strength as chairman was that he knew that he, and not the CEO or the board, had 
most inluence over the “shareholders,” i.e. the members of the CCP, high and low. he irst demon-
strated this by his speech of July 31, 1955, on collectivisation. Though the great majority of the 
board wanted to take the collectivisation process gradually to avoid the disaster that befell Soviet 
agriculture, when Mao told cadres in the countryside to stop tottering along like old women with 
bound feet, they sprang into action. he continued to demonstrate this dominance throughout his 
tenure of oice with the rectiication campaign, the GLF, the Socialist Education Movement, and 
inally the CR.
as that list demonstrates, the key quality for a Chinese chairman was vision, a sense of the 
direction where he thought the country should go, and the personality and charisma to convince 
the board and the country at large to follow him. Mao was essentially a big picture man; unlike 
Stalin, he would never have secluded himself in the oices of the central committee, plotting his 
Leadership Styles at the Party centre:  
From Mao Zedong to Xi Jinping
Roderick MacFarquhar
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  The leadership styles of the PRC’s top 
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ries: chairmen of the board and CEOs. 
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suggests may be problematic in terms  
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moves in careful detail. having outlasted and outwitted other aspirants to the leadership of the 
CCP, and then presided over the transformation of the beaten remnant that made it to the end 
of the Long March into the disciplined party and army that defeated the superior numbers of the 
KMT and took over China, Mao had the advantage of an almost impregnable position. after years 
in the wilderness, the cadres had food, jobs and prestige running China. Mao had envisioned victo-
ry and he had been right. Why could his subsequent visions not be right too?
But they weren’t. Moreover Mao’s visions were in conlict with the party. he wanted a 
hundred lowers to bloom, but the cadres did not, rightly fearing the criticism that would be 
unleashed against them. he saw GLF success through unleashing the peasant masses, but the 
cadres ensured that they were always in command. he wanted a socialist education movement 
to re-convince the peasants of the advantages of collectivism, but his colleagues turned it 
into an attack on corrupt rural cadres. Mao understood the need for organisation, but hated 
bureaucracy.
almost certainly it was his discomfort at having to work through the layers of oicialdom 
which Liu Shaoqi and Zhou Enlai had created in party and state, as much as his vision of establish-
ing a redder China, that led him to upend the whole enterprise in 1966. Only in the CR was he able 
to unleash the masses against the party and state bureaucracies which he abhorred. Throughout 
his years in power, Mao was looking for an alter ego, a successor whom he could trust more than 
Liu to implement his vision, but in diferent ways Gao Gang, Lin Biao and Deng let him down. In 
desperation and on his death bed, he chose hua Guofeng as his successor, but he surely realised 
that hua had neither the ability nor the standing with his colleagues to survive, even with Ye 
Jianying and Li Xiannian as his mentors. Mao knew that only Deng had the requisite revolutionary 
credentials and personal self-conidence to succeed him. 
The key quality 
for a Chinese 
chairman was 
vision, a sense 
of the direction 
where he thought 
the country 
should go, and 
the personality 
and charisma 
to convince the 
board and the 
country at large 
to follow him. 
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DENG: CHAIRMAN AS MODERNISER
Though hua combined the posts of party chairman, prime minister, and head of the party’s military 
afairs commission, once he had indicated that his vision replicated Mao’ s – there would have to be 
future cultural revolutions – his fate was sealed. Deng and his colleagues gradually stripped him of 
his posts. Deng was not prepared even to allow him to be his CEO.
Despite his roles as CEO and COO, Deng like Mao was a big picture man. as general secretary 
from 1956–1966, he was a member of the CCP leadership rather than the administrative facilitator 
which the Soviet elite thought they were getting when Stalin was appointed to that role. Much of 
the legwork associated with the party secretariat, he left to his no. 2, Peng Zhen, or more junior 
colleagues. When he inally emerged from Mao’s shadow to become China’s “paramount” leader 
in 1978, he too had a vision: the transformation of the poverty-stricken and backward country 
Mao had bequeathed into a modern, prosperous nation, emulating the economic miracles that had 
sprouted all over East asia while China was subjected to Mao’s disastrous visions. Fortunately, 
Deng’s “board,” senior gerontocrats like Chen Yun who had also survived the Cultural Revolution, 
largely agreed with him, albeit they advocated greater caution in the implementation of reform 
and opening up.
at 74, Deng too needed a CEO, and he chose two: hu Yaobang to run the party and Zhao 
Ziyang to craft the implementation of reform. having laid out his vision in very broad terms, Deng 
seems to have seen his role as charting particularly bold new ideas like opening up special eco-
nomic zones, airming reversals of Maoist policies like decollectivisation, adjuring oicials to seek 
truth from facts not doctrine, and removing the stigma from striving for wealth. he also ran inter-
ference for his two CEOs with “board” members. however, it turned out that hu had emerged from 
the CR too liberal, and Deng sacriiced him to the “board” in 1987. and when in the Tiananmen 
events of 1989, the “board” proved prescient to have worried about the pace of reform, Deng had 
to sacriice Zhao when he refused to preside over the imposition of martial law.
THE CEOS: JIANG ZEMIN AND HU JINTAO
If the Tiananmen Papers are to be credited, Jiang Zemin was the choice of Chen Yun and Li Xian-
nian to succeed Zhao as Deng’s CEO; perhaps Deng felt in a weak position to insist on his prefer-
ence for Li Ruihuan. and he felt suicient conidence in Jiang to cede to him the chairmanship of 
the party’s central military afairs commission. Like his predecessors, Jiang beneited from some 
protection from the chairman of the “board,” Deng, doubtless as a result of the support of board 
members, the more conservative Chen and Li. Indeed in his early years as general secretary, Jiang 
displayed a conservative attitude towards reform, and it was rumoured that Deng might seek 
to replace him. But after the shock of the collapse of the Soviet Union at the end of 1991, Deng 
made his southern tour to re-emphasise the importance of pressing ahead with reform and Jiang 
fell into line.
In 1993, Jiang became the irst CCP leader since Mao to run the party and be state president. 
Increasingly, as Deng and other leaders died, he seemed to become his own man, but was still not 
a “paramount” leader nor a chairman. Indeed, in the run-up to the 1997 party congress, his right to 
continue in oice was challenged by Qiao Shi on age grounds. Under Deng’s rules, both men were 
scheduled for retirement. Deng had died earlier in 1997, but fortunately for Jiang, the last of the 
gerontocratic “board,” the 89-year-old Bo Yibo, intervened to assert that Jiang could not resign 
since he had been described by Deng as the “core” of the successor leadership. Jiang was now a 
leader in his own right, a CEO without a chairman of the board.
Unsurprisingly, Jiang thought that he could now become chairman of the board. he was for-
tunate in that he had a ready-made CEO in Premier Zhu Rongji who was running the economy. But 
to ill the role, Jiang had to reveal the vision that chairmen normally put before their people. To-
wards the end of his period in oice, Jiang unveiled the “three represents,” basically an expansive 
view of the party’s constituency which permitted even businessmen to become members, thus 
letting the foxes into the chicken coop. Jiang further attempted to assert his role by emulating 
Deng and retaining the chairmanship of the MaC after he had handed over the oice of general 
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secretary to his Deng-picked successor, hu Jintao. after a couple of years, Jiang was persuaded 
that this arrangement could not work as it had done in Deng’s time and he relinquished the post 
to hu. By the end of his time in oice, Jiang had acquired the self-conidence to act as a chairman, 
but the senior members of the party and the PLa were not prepared to acknowledge him as such.
It is doubtful that hu Jintao, a man truly grey in his eminence, ever contemplated morphing 
into the role of chairman. Rather, he gave the impression that he was surprised that Deng had 
even assigned him the role of CEO. nevertheless, with the assistance of Wen Jiabao, he tried to 
deal with major problems facing the country and managed to keep the economy going when 
recession hit much of the rest of the world in 2008. he handed over to Xi Jinping a country in fair 
running order.
XI JINPING: CHAIRMAN AND CEO?
Xi came to oice with certain advantages: he was the irst leader of China since Mao to have 
been picked by his peers and not by a previous leader; he was a princeling, an inheritance which 
gave him a status and a self-conidence his two predecessors lacked; having weathered the Cul-
tural Revolution, he presumably had developed survival skills which should serve him well in the 
cutthroat world of Chinese politics; and his putative rival for the top job, Bo Xilai, had been purged 
before he took oice. But nobody at home or abroad expected Xi to move so swiftly to aban-
don the role of CEO and move towards that of chairman. his steps along the way are by now 
well-known. The creation of new committees on the economy and national security, chaired by 
himself, downgrading the role of the premier and putting himself in charge of all security matters, 
domestic and foreign; the swearing of allegiance of 18 generals in the pages of the People’s Daily; 
a fast developing cult of personality for “dada” Xi and his wife; the publication of his writings in 
book form and their distribution at home and abroad; and most recently, his acquisition of a truly 
military title, seemingly transforming him into the supreme general in operational command of the 
armed forces.
Clearly Xi has a vision, the “China dream” or the renaissance of the Chinese nation, which he 
revealed early on. Concrete manifestations and irst steps are to be found in the campaign against 
corruption, the concept of the road and the belt, the new international infrastructure bank, the 
assertion of China’s right to most of the South China Sea. But it is unclear if he trusts anyone 
other than himself to oversee the achievement of these objectives.
While Wang Qishan seems irmly established as anti-corruption czar, there is so far nobody 
who has emerged as Xi’s CEO.
Could it be that Xi doesn’t trust anybody other than himself to carry out his policies? If so, 
history suggests there will be problems ahead. The Maoist period showed that the country could 
be rescued from even the most disastrous visions of a chairman if there were a competent CEO 
in place. The reform era demonstrated that a conident chairman could purge a CEO who was not 
satisfactory without massive disruption. The Jiang and hu eras showed that CEOs could run the 
country without a chairman if they were reasonably competent. But are there enough hours in a 
day for somebody to combine the roles of chairman and CEO, Mao and Zhou, or Deng and Zhao 
Ziyang? Or perhaps more importantly, will Xi’s colleagues allow him to play the role that combining 
the two jobs would mean? Or has Xi already achieved a position so powerful that no colleague 
would dare move against him?
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after the 2012 18th Party Congress, Xi Jinping and his ally Wang Qishan carried out the largest 
purge of the senior party leadership since the end of the Cultural Revolution. Retired Politburo 
member Xu Caihou and retired Politburo Standing Committee member Zhou Yongkang became 
targets of anti-corruption investigations by the Central Commission for Discipline Inspection 
(CCDI) (Wu and Li 2013). at a lower level, a large scale reshuling also occurred. Between the late 
2012 18th Party Congress and november 2015, some 59 current provincial/ministerial oicials, as 
well as scores of retired ministerial level oicials, have been charged with corruption (Chen 2015).
Given this unusual turnover, a key question for international observers of China is whether 
Xi Jinping will be able to completely dominate politics in China at the 19th Party Congress, which 
is scheduled to take place in 2017. The short answer is that while Xi can dominate the Politburo 
Standing Committee if he shrank the size to ive members, it is highly unlikely that he can staf the 
Central Committee with close followers. The vast majority of oicials in the Central Committee 
likely will still be those with little past history with Xi. One consequence of Xi’s inability to dom-
inate the Central Committee may be his continual reliance on the leading small group system to 
make policy, thus permanently reversing power sharing arrangements in the CCP. 
The data presented below come from an updated data base on the Chinese elite, which is 
based on an original data set compiled by Shih, Liu, Shan (Shih et al. 2008; Meyer et al. 2015). 
This database contains all available biographical information on full and alternate members of the 
Central Committee (CC) member, as well as provincial standing committee members since 1978. 
For each signiicant position in the government, a unique code is assigned to it. In this manner, 
the data base can trace all positions held by every political elite in the data base, as well as the 
start and end years of them holding these positions (Shih et al. 2010). This allows me to identify 
factional ailiation by observing coincidences in work units between a patron and his clients. 
I assume a factional tie to exist if a patron worked in the same ministerial organ as a client at 
the same time within two administrative steps of the client prior to the patron’s entry into the 
Politburo. 
Eforts at exterminating factionalism under Xi Jinping:  
Will Xi Jinping dominate Chinese politics  
after the 19th Party Congress?
Victor Shih
KEY FINDINGS 
  Xi has used the anti-corruption 
campaign to strengthen his own power, 
and is poised to dominate politics at 
the highest level after the 19th Party 
Congress. 
  Based on an analysis of factional ties, 
Xi lacks absolute dominance in the 
Politburo Standing Committee (PBSC) 
and the Central Committee (CC). In 
order to retain his unchallenged role 
in decision making he will continue 
empowering leading small groups at 
the expense of the PBSC and CC. 
  Such a realignment of power structures 
will have negative efects on political 
incentives for leaders outside Xi’s 
network, including reducing motivation 
to improve performance or to share 
information.
  anD it also encourages sycophantic 
behaviour towards Xi, thereby 
diminishing his awareness of others’ 
actual political loyalty and causing 
political deadlocks. 
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XI GAINS MORE POWER THROUGH THE ANTI-CORRUPTION CAMPAIGN
Clearly, the anti-corruption campaign had a noticeable impact on the relative power of Xi Jinping. 
In Figure 3, I calculate the share of alternate and full Central Committee members who have ties 
with various senior leaders in the party over time. as Figure 3 shows, between the 2007 17th 
Party Congress and the 2012 18th Party Congress, the relative power of hu Jintao, the incumbent, 
Xi Jinping, the successor, and Zhou Yongkang, the potential challenger, did not change because 
hu Jintao did not launch any anti-corruption campaign to remove high level oicials between party 
congresses. however, since the 18th PC, several full and alternate CC members were removed, 
thus changing the power balance. 
To be sure, the largest change in power balance came from regular retirement and promotion 
which took place at the 18th Party Congress, which saw 14 hu Jintao followers retiring from the 
Central Committee due to age, thus dramatically lowering the share of his followers in the Central 
Committee from 9% to just 5.5%. The retirement process even afected the younger Xi Jinping, 
who saw the share of his followers reduced from 7% to 6% of all full and alternate CC members. 
Zhou Yongkang, which always had a smaller faction as the security Tsar of China, saw his faction 
shrink by 1% of the full and alternate CC elite. 
The impact of the anti-corruption campaign is seen after the 2012 18th Party Congress. Un-
like in the 2007 and 2012 period, the post-2012 period saw luctuations in CC memberships. For 
Xi Jinping’s faction, it was not afected as only one person in his faction was removed. hu Jintao’s 
faction, in contrast, lost two people and saw its inluence in the CC reduced by 0.5%. Zhou Yon-
gkang’s faction lost four individuals to the anti-corruption campaign, reducing its representation 
in the CC by nearly 1% as of June 2015. Moreover, Zhou’s faction lost dozens more members at a 
lower level, which meant those who had worked with Zhou could never obtain a sizable presence 
in the CC in the future (Caixin 2014). Relative to his predecessor hu Jintao and Zhou Yongkang, 
Figure 3
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anti-corruption has bolstered Xi Jinping’s power in the main selectorate body, the Central Com-
mittee. Most likely, the continuation of the anti-corruption campaign before the 2017 19th Party 
Congress and the Congress itself will see the bolstering of Xi’s power in the Central Committee 
relative to the other leaders, past or present.
XI’S FACTION MAY DOMINATE, BUT NOT THROUGH THE CENTRAL COMMITTEE
however, does it mean that his faction will dominate politics at the upper echelon? at the highest 
level, the answer may well be positive, especially if Xi reduces the number of Politburo Standing 
Committee (PBSC) seats from seven to ive. In a ive-people PBSC, Xi can promote trusted follow-
ers Zhao Leji and Li Zhanshu to replace retiring PBSC members. Even if Li Keqiang stayed in power 
and was able to promote a China Youth League cadre to the PBSC, Xi will have a majority in the 
PBSC. 
Unlike the populous Youth League faction, which occupied almost 10% of the Central Com-
mittee prior to the 17th Party Congress, Xi’s faction is still only less than 6% of the CC. Thus, short 
of a massive elevation of Xi cronies from below the CC level into the CC, Xi’s faction members, 
deined as those who built ties with Xi prior to his elevation into the Politburo, likely will remain 
a small minority of the CC elite. To be sure, plenty of senior oicials with no historical ties with Xi 
doubtless have pledged their loyalty to the powerful secretary general. however, is their loyalty 
credible? 
In addition, Xi’s faction is aging, and only 6 CC members ailiated to Xi will be able to stay 
in the Central Committee at the 19th Party Congress, if age rules are adhered. among alternate 
members of CC, Xi’s faction has 7 current members, and they all can continue in oice at the 19th 
Party Congress. Thus, even if all 6 Xi-ailiated alternate CC members are promoted to full CC 
membership at the 19th Party Congress, Xi’s faction will only be 6% of the Central Committee, as-
suming that the size of the CC remains the same. Even if Xi doubled his faction’s representation in 
the CC by promoting 13 non-CC oicials into full CC membership, a feat only Mao accomplished at 
the 9th Party Congress, Xi’s representation in the CC would still be 12%. If the Central Committee 
continues to play a meaningful role in policy formulation and approval at the highest level, Xi may 
continue to run into some constraints, even after consolidating power further at the 19th Party 
Congress. Of course, the above facts likely were well known to Xi and his advisors. Therefore, in 
addition to reshuling top leaders, Xi also enacted important institutional changes to top-level 
policy making. Instead of discussing and deciding important issues at the Central Committee, Po-
litburo, or even the Politburo Standing Committee meetings, Xi has formed a large number of new 
leading groups which took over some decision making from the Politburo Standing Committee 
(PBSC) (huang 2014). after ascending to power in 2012, Xi formed new leading groups on eco-
nomic reform, national security, internet security, and reform of the military, all of which chaired by 
Xi himself (Keck 2014; huang 2014). The only new leading group not chaired by Xi was the leading 
group on soccer reform, chaired by Liu Yandong. Many decisions which had been discussed and 
voted on in the PBSC now were decided by the leading groups, where Xi could personally drive the 
agenda (huang 2014; Johnson and Kennedy 2015). To be sure, these leading groups were typically 
“temporary” organisations which ceased to exist once certain policy objectives had been reached. 
IMPLICATIONS FOR A LEADERSHIP SYSTEM BUILT ON “TEMPORARY” 
INSTITUTIONS AND ONE-SIDED FAVOURITISM 
The relative low CC representation of Xi followers even after the 19th Party Congress, however, 
likely will mean that if Xi wanted to continue to control policy agenda, he will continue to rely 
heavily on “temporary” institutions such as the leading groups for policy making instead of on 
more established forums such as the Central Committee and the Politburo. This likely would be the 
case even if Xi obtained a majority at the PBSC level. The institutionalisation of the leading group 
system potentially has profound efects on political incentives within the party. 
Short of a mas-
sive elevation 
of Xi cronies 
from below the 
CC level into the 
CC, Xi’s faction 
members likely 
will remain a 
small minority of 
the CC elite.
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First and foremost, oicials without historical ties to Xi may ind themselves with largely 
honorary positions with little power. Even a full CC or even Politburo member may have little actual 
power in policy jurisdiction they nominally control. They thus have few incentives and authorities 
to improve performance, especially in the absence of any apparent systemic threats. no matter 
what they do, their chance of promotion or rent-seeking may lag behind close followers of Xi and 
Xi himself. They may not even channel information efectively to those in charge, i.e. the leading 
groups. Overall, the information lows and motivation in policy making may become weaker. 
Second, although institutionalising a true dictatorship gives the top leader executive power 
over a wide range of policies, it provides less information on the relative loyalty of oicials and the 
relative balance of power at the elite level. That is, more oicials will engage in sycophancy toward 
Xi himself, given the concentration of power. In the absence of sycophantic behaviour toward 
other PBSC members, Xi actually has less information of who is loyal to him. also, policy conlicts 
between various top leaders constituted a major channel through which top leaders tested each 
others’ power without violence or other regime endangering behaviour. The end of top-level pol-
icy debates will also shut of this avenue of political information for Xi. In the meantime, lower 
level policy debates and lobbying will continue, which means that policy deadlocks may continue. 
In sum, although Xi likely will be able to dominate politics at the highest level after the 19th 
Party Congress, he still will have limited representation in the Central Committee. his relatively 
weak representation in the CC provides incentive for him to make the leading group system a 
permanent decision-making mechanism through his tenure, and maybe even beyond the 20th 
Party Congress if he continues as party secretary general. a true test of the diminution of Central 
Committee, Politburo, and PBSC power will be their role in personnel promotion at the 19th and 
20th Party Congress. 
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The Xi leadership has continued the CCP’s paternalistic view of its role with respect to society and 
the infantilisation of its citizens, treating them as children who cannot be trusted to evaluate con-
licting or dissenting information. The leadership reserves the right to decide what information 
should be available to society and what should be censored. however, what was not expected 
was the extent to which the new leadership would pursue this objective of control over discourse 
and crack down on dissenting views. 
Whether these stronger eforts at control can be considered a sign of weakness or are born 
out of a sense of fear, it is di cult to say. In reality, it might be both. The repeated references to 
Western inluences and the need to eradicate them would attest to the prevalence of ideas such 
as constitutionalism, universal values and civil society among China’s intellectual elites. The char-
itable view has been that Xi needs to exert tighter control over party, state and society in order 
to push through di cult reforms against vested interests. Certainly, on consolidating power, Xi 
concluded that “it’s the politics stupid” and that unless the party was drilled into a tight body to 
regain societal trust and promote reforms, its legacy was in danger. however, the severity and du-
ration of not only the anti-corruption campaign but also the attacks on unorthodox ideas, societal 
organisation and negative portrayals of CCP history have been the toughest since the attempts 
to rein in society after the 1989 student-led demonstrations. 
RESTRAINING FOREIGN INFLUENCES
The strongest expression is to be found in the april 22, 2013 Document number 9, which outlined 
seven topics that should not be discussed. This is one of the most conservative documents that 
has been disseminated through oicial channels during the reform period. among the seven nos 
are criticism of those who promote “universal values” as such views shake the party’s ideological 
and theoretical foundations. The promotion of “civil society” is said to undermine the social basis 
of the ruling party, while “western constitutional democracy” negates the key features of the 
Chinese socialist system. Finally, “press freedom” challenges the principle of party control over 
the press and publications. To reinforce this last point, in February 2016, Xi visited the three key 
party-run media outlets to inform staf that they must pledge complete loyalty to the CCP. as Xi 




With respect to relations with society, 
the Xi Jinping leadership has:
  continued their predecessors 
paternalistic approach to limiting 
citizens’ access to information and 
exerting monopoly control over such 
information as they are able to see;. 
  BUT has been harsher than many 
expected in terms of controlling 
discourse not just within the Chinese 
Communist Party (CCP) but also within 
society; 
  has moved to contain what it sees 
as undue Western inluence in the 
intellectual sphere;
  allowed the Third Sector to expand in 
order to deliver better social services for 
China’s citizens;
  BUT will ensure that civil society as 
a realm of association and discussion 
shrinks.
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commented “all the work by the party’s media must relect the party’s will, safeguard the party’s 
authority, and safeguard the party’s unity…They must love the party, protect the party and closely 
align themselves with the party leadership in thought, politics and action.” 
The document criticises manipulation by western embassies, consulates and non-govern-
mental organisations for supporting anti-government forces and spreading western values. Thus, 
Western inluences are blamed for a number of ills and in February 2015, China’s Minister of Edu-
cation called for banning textbooks that promote western values, claiming that “Young teachers 
and students are key targets of iniltration by enemy forces.” (Seeking Truth 2016). Foreign nGOs 
have been singled out as a source of particular concern, as China’s leaders absorb what they think 
are the lessons of the causes of unrest in the former Eastern and Central Europe, the arab Spring 
and the Umbrella Movement in hong Kong. 
Following the national Security Law that was passed on July 1, 2015, a tough draft to govern 
the activities of foreign nGOs was loated for reaction. The draft calls for the nGOs to register 
with the public security bureau at the relevant level rather than with the Ministry of Civil afairs, 
which has greater experience in working with foreign nGOs. Oicials at the Ministry claimed that 
they were not consulted about this signiicant change. This centralisation of control under the 
Ministry of Public Security, while retaining the need for the sponsoring agency, will make the 
operations of foreign nGOs more di cult. 
WELCOMING (DOMESTIC, NON-THREATENING) NGOS
at the same time, however, for certain domestic groups registration has been made easier 
and the new Charity Law, passed in March 2016, is intended to encourage domestic giving to 
causes that the CCP prioritises. The leadership clearly understands that its government agencies 
do not have the capacity to deal with all the challenges that society faces and thus wants to en-
courage more structured citizen engagement. Currently, social organisations, to use the Chinese 
terminology, working in the areas of social service provision or are public beneit and charitable 
organisations, scientiic and educational organisations, or are economic and trade associations, 
may register directly with the Ministry of Civil afairs, not the Ministry of Public Security, and no 
longer need a sponsoring agency. 
however, any organisation engaged in work in the realms of religion, political or religious ac-
tivity is not accorded this new possibility. Indeed most organisations that fall in these categories 
will be closed down or repressed. This is especially the case for those that fall in the category of 
what Jude howell refers to as “organizing around marginalized interests.” This has been noticeable 
with the crackdown on labour organizing, especially in the South of China and the rolling up of the 
“new Citizens’ Movement” whose leader, Xu Zhiyong, was arrested in July 2013. The crackdown 
on quasi-independent labour organisations, often referred to as labour centres, has been accel-
erating since the second half of 2015. Groups such as the haige Workers’ Centre or the Panyu 
Dagongzu Service Centre, have not been involved in anti-party activity but rather in advocacy on 
behalf of workers (often migrant workers) and carrying out actions such as trying to help claim 
unpaid back wages, promoting collective bargaining, and mediating workplace conlicts. The same 
fate has befallen to some other groups working within the law to protect citizens’ rights guaran-
teed by relevant laws and the constitution. In 2015, the authorities moved against lawyers who 
were engaged in rights-based activities. according to an article in the new York Times (Jacobs 
and Buckely 2015) some 200 lawyers and associates had been detained with 20 still in custody. 
The CCP has moved to delegitimise what it saw as a movement by accusing participants of hooli-
ganism, embezzlement, self-aggrandisement, and sexual ofences. The Beijing Fengrui Law Firm 
became a particular target with its director arrested in January 2016.
Last but not least is the example of women’s rights. Several women’s rights activists were 
arrested in March 2015 in the run up to International Women’s Day. While released, the actions 
were clearly part of a concerted movement by the party to deter the increasing number of people 
and organisations that are involved in rights’ defence. That this is policy intent was reinforced 
in January 2016, by the forced closing of the Beijing Zhongze Women’s Legal Counselling and 
Service Centre. This followed Beijing University, which had been its original sponsor, withdrawing 
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support in 2010. The Centre, like the workers’ centres, had been engaged in advocacy to help 
women sufering from domestic violence, in employment disputes and those over child custody. 
Closing such potential “safety valves” dealing constructively with backire on the authorities. With 
restricted legal recourse, tensions will simmer and may boil over more readily into social unrest. 
The diference in attitude towards civic association from encouragement to control is shown 
by the diferent treatment in the Twelfth and Thirteenth Five-Year Programmes (2011–15 and 
2016–2020 respectively). The Twelfth Programme devoted a whole section to social manage-
ment innovation. It called for more public participation to improve public services and policies 
using the phrase the “party leads, government takes responsibility, society coordinates, and the 
public participates.” This progress seemed to be maintained in the resolution of the 18th Central 
Committee’s 3rd plenum (December 2013) where “social management innovation” was replaced 
by “social governance”, encouraging social actors to have a role in governance alongside govern-
ment and business. Subsequently, the actions outlined above reveal that the CCP has pulled back 
from this stance, presumably fearing the kind of activism that it seemed to be encouraging. By 
contrast, the Thirteenth Five-Year Programme emphasises control and monitoring. The section 
on innovation in social governance calls for a “law-based social governance system under the 
leadership of party committees.” Further, the document notes “We (i.e. the Party)…guide people in 
exercising their rights, expressing their demands, and resolving their disputes in accordance with 
the law.” One further thing the section calls for is building a “national database covering basic 
information on the population.” 
FIGHTING ON THE INTERNET BATTLEFIELD
The rise of new social media is the most important new element in the relationship between the 
party and society. It provides a potential platform for unregulated exchanges but also one for the 
party to express its own views. Thus, the extension of control over society has also incorporated 
social media. Control over information has been crucial to CCP rule and it has sought continually to 
ensure that news lows vertically up and down the system through the party’s ilters. new social 
media challenges this control with its horizontal linkages and speed with which it can disseminate 
information. already in august 2013, Xi Jinping stated that the Internet is now the “major battle-
ield of public opinion” and it was important to “construct a powerful internet army to gain control 
of it.” Social media was to be “managed and used to promote the party’s views.” 
While President Clinton had stated that trying to control the Internet would be like trying to 
nail jello to the wall, the CCP has been doing its best to do just that. The Internet has been a venue 
for poking fun at oicial language, yet it also has become a venue for exposing oicial corruption 
and venality, which seemed to support Xi’s campaign against corruption. however, the party has 
made it clear that it will not accept this kind of unguided exposure of oicial abuse. In addition to 
paying people to post supportive comments online (the “Fifty Cents Party”), the party has intro-
duced a series of measures to improve control. Institutionally, in February 2014, the new Central 
Leading Group for Internet Security and Information was established with Xi as its head. Earlier 
in September 2013, it was announced that social media users who posted comments that were 
considered slanderous could face prison terms if the posts attracted 5,000 hits or were reposted 
over 500 times. In January 2015, the use of VPns was declared illegal. 
Last but not least, the party moved to blunt the efect of Weibo and caused a number of high 
proile bloggers to close their accounts. The most recent being Ren Zhiqiang (February 2016), a 
property developer with 38 million followers who had his account cancelled and was accused with 
exerting a “vile” inluence by spreading illegal information. his “vile” act had been to criticise Xi’s 
call for the media to support the party. Such actions have caused more users to move to WeChat, 
a private friending system that makes it more di cult for postings to go viral so quickly. Our 
2014 survey1 shows that the party media still dominates where people ind their information on 
breaking news, with 50.2 percent of respondents stating that they looked to television for this 
information and only 29.2 percent relying on the internet. In terms of trust, we used a 10-point 
scale and television received the highest rating for trust (8.15), followed by oicial government 
websites (7.49) with unoicial websites receiving a trust rating of 7.06. 
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THE GOAL: SERVICE PROVISION WITHOUT CRITICISM
Looking forward, the new leadership has sought to strengthen control over society and will favour 
organisations that enjoy a close relationship to government (Government-organised nGOs or Par-
ty-organised nGOs). One feature has been the push to establish or re-establish party committees 
in the new organisations such as private businesses, social organisations and foundations. Ser-
vice providers will be favoured and those organisations or individuals acting on behalf of “margin-
alised groups” will be closely monitored and closed down if they are seen to extend their inluence 
into society at large. Rural-based community organisations (clans and temples) will continue to 
lourish but farmers’ unions will not be allowed and neither will independent organisations sup-
porting workers’ rights in the cities. Double registration and tight oversight will persist for foreign 
organisations seeking to work in China. The advent of the information revolution is recognised as 
a potential threat to CCP control and attempts will continue to control discourse. The end result 
will be a situation where the Third Sector will expand to ill deiciencies in state provision but Civil 
Society as a realm for critical relection and discussion will shrink.
1 |  The survey covered 3,500 participants drawn from a representative sample of seven major cities (Beijing, 
Shanghai, Guangzhou, Wuhan, Chengdu, Shenyang and Xi’an); seven towns and townships and 28 administra-
tive villages under them. all respondents were 18 years or older. Because of the urban bias, weightings were 
used to compensate. Sites were chosen on the basis of geographic location, average per capita income, and 
population. The sites varied in all three variables, representing lower-income, middle income, and upper income 
individuals, as well as western, eastern, northern and southern populations of China.
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Expanding China’s global reach:  
Strategic priorities under Xi Jinping  – The link between the outside 
and within, and the story of the three zones
Kerry Brown
While we speculate about the amount of real power Xi Jinping has accrued within China, there is 
one issue where he is unique amongst top elite leaders in history the People’s Republic. Even in 
the era of presidential jet set travel, Xi has roamed further, to more places and to more continents 
than any other top igure in China’s history. From the time in which he took up the presidency in 
spring 2013 to the start of 2016, he has visited almost 40 countries. Only India’s Modi competes 
with him for number of international locations visited by a major head of state. But what is the 
narrative that we can divine behind these frequent lyer habits? We have to assume that Pres-
ident Xi has a very tightly packed schedule around domestic matters. how is it that visits to Fiji 
(population 400,000) which he visited in late 2014, and new Zealand (4 million) justify signiicant 
parts of his time? 
The Xi Jinping leadership has been highly activist in terms of domestic policy. But as the trav-
els of President Xi have made clear, this has been relected in a similarly expansive international 
dimension. at the time in which Chinese behaviour in the South and East China Sea has aroused 
suspicion and claims of assertiveness and pushiness, to the wider world President Xi has been 
solicitous and communicative. he has wrapped the world in a series of “grand narratives” which 
stand as the equivalents of the ambitious stories through which his leadership has promoted do-
mestic issues, reaching its peak in the “China Dream” and the “Four Comprehensives”. 
DEFINING THE WORLD IN TERMS OF ZONES
at the very start of his period as President, he asked that fellow leaders “told the China story.” 
Perhaps this was partly a response to the fact that, under his predecessor, hu Jintao, there had 
been mounting criticisms that the leadership had been too reticent on these issues of its global 
role. For Xi, this has been rectiied. There has been plenty of language from him and his colleagues 
KEY FINDINGS 
The Xi approach to the outside world 
can be typiied as follows: 
  The CCP leadership has an increasingly 
global perspective on the future of  
the country. China is open to the world, 
and going into the world, but on its  
own terms. 
  Its leaders know better than ever 
before what they want and with 
whom to cooperate. They deine the 
world in terms of three zones. China’s 
most important partners, aside from 
the United States, are predominantly 
countries geographically close to it, 
followed by more distant "civilisational 
partners”, such as the EU. 
  The Chinese leadership continues to 
avoid onerous responsibilities and 
obligations even as it seeks to develop 
deeper ties in the region and create 
benign sounding frameworks within 
which to work with the rest of the 
world.
  Foreign involvement in civil society 
and non-government organisation is 
iercely circumscribed. Businesses in 
China and foreign governments ind the 
environment and interaction with the 
Chinese government to become tougher.
Xi has wrapped 
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about the wider world, and about China’s role in it. From all this travel, and the language associat-
ed with it or used during it, there is clearly a big role that China’s foreign afairs plays in the minds 
of its current leaders in addressing its current challenges as it moves towards a middle income 
status country by 2021 and tries to achieve the irst of its centennial goals. The question, at least 
for those outside China, is what this story is, and, more importantly, what it means to them. One 
way of getting to grips with this is to think of China under Xi clearly being divided up into zones 
of strategic interest. 
Xi Jinping has mapped out in his words since 2013 during his travels a world of broadly three 
zones. In the centre of China’s world is the United States, its most important bilateral relationship 
and the one it expends most energy on. In the second zone there is the “One Belt, One Road” 
initiative, a vast idea that encompasses over 60 countries, many of them in China’s immediate 
region. Finally, there is the “civilisational partnership” idea, applied to the European Union, which 
retains its immense economic importance to China even as its political identity remains more 
vexed. These “zones” are guided by a number of diferent imperatives. They link security, political, 
geographical, economic and resource interests for China. In a sense, they “describe” or “narrate” a 
contemporary Chinese-centric view of the world, and give the outlines of the China story. Through 
Xi’s visits, this story has been unpacked. In his visits to the Middle East, to the Central asian Re-
gion, to australasia, and Latin america, as well as the three broad areas covered by the regions 
described above, the outlines of this story have now become clear. The message is that China is 
a self-conscious global actor, a country with aspirations under Xi to truly become a “rich, strong” 
country, one which enjoys its restoration moment when its pre-modern status and importance 
are returned to it. They give an indication of the scope of Chinese contemporary ambition, and its 
tactics and content. 
ZONE ONE: NEW MODEL OF MAJOR POWER RELATIONS
The U.S. remains China’s principal partner, and the one it has to undertake the most delicate and 
careful diplomacy with. It is the most nonexpendable partner, through the volume of goods sold 
into the U.S. market but, more sharply, through its huge security role in the asian region. Xi Jinping 
visited the U.S. very soon after taking up oice as president in 2013, spending two days in a re-
treat with President Obama in Sunnylands. While there he made two important statements. The 
irst was that he regarded the Paciic as “big enough” for both the U.S. and China. The second was 
that he located the relationship within a “new model of major power relations.” 
This articulation achieved two things. First it mapped out clear strategic space, in which 
China claimed some form of parity with the U.S., at least in the region (the statement about the 
Paciic is germane here, with its clear assertion that both powers have equal rights to inluence 
and operate here). and secondly, it made clear that China did not seek a competitive, and ulti-
mately potentially combative, relationship with the U.S., but something new, where it avoided the 
template of great power conlict of the past, and drove more towards parity. 
It is clear under Xi, as with his predecessors, that the ambiguity about the U.S. role in the 
asian region has not disappeared. What has become stronger is a desire for clear space around 
China where it has greater freedom of movement and inluence. The South and East China Sea 
disputes are a major part of this – theatres of symbolic rather than actual clashes (China has not 
added to its island territory in the last quarter of a century, just built on already claimed islands 
or sea features). Through proxy agents (isherman, lifeguards, Chinese citizens) the Chinese state 
has sought to test the strength of resolve of its immediate neighbours who are involved in the 
dispute. Of these, several (Japan, Philippines, Brunei, and, in a unique way Taiwan) are allies of 
the U.S. Chinese behaviour has sought to create doubt and hesitancy about what the contesting 
powers in the maritime disputes might do to protect their claimed interests. In that sense, at the 
moment at least, the tensions in the region are best described as “phantom” or “shadow” clashes. 
They pit intent and ambition with each other, rather than military assets. But of course a miscal-
culation could cause that to change. 
The “new model of major power relations” only concerns China and the U.S., and consists of 
a double-pronged approach. For non-regional issues, China’s ambition is not to be lulled into the 
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responsibilities of a G2 kind of power. It does not want to be seen as an alternative to the U.S., 
taking on onerous security responsibilities not linked to its own tangible core national interests in 
what it regards as remote parts of the world. In the Middle East, africa, and Latin america, there-
fore, it does not wish to be positioned as a successor to the U.S., setting up military assets and 
being pulled as a potential deal broker into complex and long standing political disputes. It prefers 
to work through the Un, in concert with others, rather than taking the lead on issues like this. But 
once we come to China’s own immediate region, the simple fact that can be seen more intensively 
under Xi is that China regards the U.S. as oppressing its own ambition to be the major regional 
actor. Within “major power relations” there is this clear tension, therefore, and a less benign mes-
sage: we are not active right up to your sovereign space, so can you please do the same and get 
out of our own space.
ZONE TWO: COUNTRIES ALONG THE BELT AND ROAD
as one of the last ive countries in the world where a Communist Party still has a monopoly on 
power (the others are the DPRK, Laos, Vietnam and Cuba), China is an increasingly exceptional 
power. Its political model is alienating for many outside the country. The rest of the world displays 
plenty of mixed feelings about how they view China. In the economic realm, it is clear that Chinese 
oicials and business people talk a very similar language to their counterparts in the wider cap-
italist world. But over security issues, and in the political realm, China’s domestic system creates 
distrust and suspicion. 
This is particularly intense around China’s immediate borders, where misunderstandings and 
distaste for its one-party model, and the imperatives within its domestic polity of ensuring that 
everything is geared towards preserving the one party-state create a sense that even for invest-
ment or purely economic activities there is a larger political agenda motivating the Chinese state. 
From 2013 during a visit to Central asia, Xi Jinping started to refer to the idea of the One Belt, 
One Road, though this was originally through ideas around the historic (and somewhat nebulous) 
silk roads. Capitalising on the romance of these putatively ancient trade links, Xi’s advisors devel-
oped ideas contained in the work of academic Wang Jisi to extend China’s inluence landwards, and 
westwards, rather than focusing on its maritime aspirations to the east. In 2014, the idea became 
encapsulated in the One Belt, One Road initiative, something that embraced South asia, aSEan, 
Central asia, Russia, parts of the Middle East, australia, and even reached into parts of Eastern 
Europe. 
One Belt One Road has at core a unifying message: that for all those countries embraced by 
the idea, there is an invitation to focus on economic and trade links with China, developing and 
deepening them. Part of this is a movement for simpliication, stripping aside the more complex 
geopolitical and diplomatic issues, ignoring complex diferences over security, and instead ap-
pealing to countries around it to consider ways they can make more money and get more beneit 
from their extant economic links with China. Operating like a vast common trade zone, the most 
tangible spin-of since 2015 has been the asia Infrastructure Investment Bank. a White Paper 
issued by the State Council on the whole initiative in 2015 was bereft of speciics, simply stating 
that the One Belt, One Road operated more as an invitation for countries to propose co-operative 
projects with China. Spawning vast numbers of conferences, seminars and activities, it has been 
embraced on the level of rhetoric – but as yet there have been few solid investment outcomes. 
What One Belt One Road does achieve, however, is more in the symbolic realm – creating a 
zone of China-centric interest, but one focused on benign issues of trade. This avoids arousing 
the antipathy of the U.S. and its allies. It also carves out an area of legitimate hegemony for China, 
one that does not involve direct discussion of security, but more the creation of trade depend-
encies and a discourse of mutual beneit rather than lofty appeals to international humanitarian 
responsibilities and norms. In 2016, One Belt One Road has become the epitome of the Xi era 
style of high sounding rhetoric. The question is now whether such an ambitious idea will translate 
into something more tangible, and whether that will not eventually look like an attempt to create 
greater political leverage on the top of economic dependency. 
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ZONE THREE: CIVILISATIONAL PARTNERS
The European Union is China’s largest intellectual partner. Through technology transfers, its gov-
ernments and companies have helped create prosperity, and entrepreneurialism within China since 
the start of the Reform Era. Germany and the UK in particular have been at the forefront of this. and 
yet the EU’s division into 28 member states, and the fractious and sometimes contradictory policy 
positions these states take on China, on issues ranging from human rights to the arms embargo 
imposed in 1989, to the ongoing disputes about granting China market economy status, all serve 
to underline just how complex, and sometimes for Chinese at least, unreliable a partner the EU is. 
The era in which it has been beset by crisis ranging from the Eurozone turmoil from 2009 onwards 
have only deepened Chinese frustration at the Union’s capriciousness, its desire to often adopt a 
moralizing and superior tone towards China, and yet very clear evidence of its own internal fragility. 
Xi Jinping’s visit to Brussels in 2014 coincided with a new State Council White Paper on Chi-
nese EU relations, reinforcing the positions taken in the irst in 2003, but showing a clear harden-
ing of lines over issues like human rights, Tibet, and recognition of Taiwan. The 2014 paper was 
harshly prescriptive, perhaps a sign of how much the Chinese have moved beyond their earlier as-
pirations towards the EU as a useful counterweight to the U.S. and now view it as a more complex, 
and sometimes more contentious partner, but still one they need to operate within a constructive 
framework. Civilisational partners was the term that Xi used when speaking in Bruges in late March 
2014. This managed to achieve the same kind of parity with the EU as “major power relations” did 
as a descriptor of China and the U.S. But it also recognised that the EU was simply not a signiicant, 
uniied security and military actor on the same level as the U.S., and that it has a bewildering in-
ternal political complexity. “Civilisation” captures some of the things Chinese do admire about the 
EU – cultural assets, diversity, history, creativity, and intellectual prowess. But it also makes clear 
that the EU is no uniied nation state. 
THE THREE ZONES AND THE XI VIEW OF THE WORLD:  
CHINA OPENS, BUT ON ITS OWN TERMS
The three grand narrative descriptors that Xi has used over the last three years, during his busy 
international schedule, typify a contemporary oicial mind-set in Beijing. In the current era of re-
form, where there are so many complex domestic issues to attend to, benign and stable relations 
with the outside world remain important. Despite this, the need in an era of falling GDP growth and 
slowing economic achievements to seek legitimacy in other realms means that the Party beeing 
up its nationalist credentials, and toughening its stance in the region while playing a largely sym-
bolic international role should not be surprising. This lies at the heart of the tension within China’s 
posture regarding the outside world. 
Where there has been clear evolution is that under Xi there has been at least a greater will-
ingness to speak to the wider world about what role China wishes to play in it, and a tactical un-
derstanding of where, and how, China needs the outside world involved in it. Foreign involvement 
in civil society and non-government organisation, and through political inluence, has been iercely 
circumscribed. Businesses in China have found the environment has become tougher. With Glax-
oSmithKline, China served warning that it would take on any multinational, no matter how large 
or important its sector, where it felt it was being exploited, and where it knew the company could 
not walk away from the possible future proits the country’s emerging middle class society ofers. 
The Xi approach to the outside world can be typiied in a simple concluding sentence: China 
open to the world, and going into the world, but increasingly on its own terms. China knows bet-
ter than ever before what it wants (status, intellectual partnership, economic links), how it wants 
to achieve these (through concentrating on its strategic region, creating benign sounding frame-
works within which to work with the rest of the world beyond this region, and avoiding onerous 
responsibilities and obligations), and who it wants to achieve these with (predominantly countries 
geographically close to it, countries It needs resources from, or has major export markets in, or 
wants intellectual property from). In the era of global China, this in essence is the global perspec-
tive of its leadership. 
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Carrying the China Dream out into the world:
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POWER MAY BE CENTRALISED, BUT THE CENTRE’S DEPENDENCE  
ON SUBNATIONAL GOVERNMENTS FOR IMPLEMENTATION REMAINS
The leadership transition in 2012/13 did not just mark a clear handover of power to a new gen-
eration of top leaders: it also redirected the Chinese political system in some rather radical ways. 
Starting a major (and still ongoing) anti-corruption campaign was but one signal from the lead-
ership showing its political determination to bring about change. The new leadership also put 
forward an ambitious catalogue of new goals and mechanisms for policymaking, embodied by 
the CCP’s “decision on major issues concerning comprehensively deepening reforms” unveiled at 
the 18th Central Committee’s 3rd plenum in november 2013. Containing a strong mandate to 
push forward major reforms, the decision gives top priority to policies that call for increased mar-
ket orientation. It simultaneously provides for an enhanced top-down, centralised governance 
mode that leaves no doubt that the CCP has ultimate control (ahlers et al. 2013). In 2016, most of 
the policy-related decisions were further elaborated upon in the 13th Five-year plan of the PRC 
(2016–2020). 
Progress towards these goals, and the ultimate success of the CCP’s reform plans, critically de-
pends on subnational governments, especially at the provincial, municipal and county levels. In the 
past, the central leadership often faced local circumvention or covert non-compliance in response 
to new initiatives. Therefore, one of the biggest challenges the current core executive inherited 
was enforcing compliance and guaranteeing efective and sustainable policy implementation. 
Top-level design and local-level paralysis: 
Local politics in times of political centralisation 
Anna L. Ahlers and Matthias Stepan 
KEY FINDINGS
  China’s leadership under Xi has rein-
forced the party’s hierarchical command 
structures, demonstrated through its 
top-down campaigns, focusing on aus-
terity, anti-corruption eforts and party 
discipline. It has reinvigorated sanction-
ing and incentive mechanisms for local 
cadres, with unknown efects on their 
long-term performance and loyalty to 
the CCP. 
  Re-centralising the intergovernmental 
inancial system strengthens the overall 
steering capacity of the central govern-
ment temporarily, but does not alleviate 
the iscal stress on local governments. 
The central government is pushing for 
greater market orientation at the local 
level, resulting, thus far, in short-sight-
ed solutions that will end up reducing 
transparency concerning local debt. 
  Local leaders are abstaining from bold 
policy moves out of fear of demotion, 
exclusion from the party, or legal reper-
cussions. Consequently, subnational 
governments have ceased to act as 
independent actors of policy initiative 
and innovation. Policy piloting and ex-
perimentation will remain an important 
component of the policy process, but 
will be employed only very selectively 
and under the auspices of the central 
government.
  These reconigurations of central-local 
relations give the central leadership 
more tools to enforce local compliance, 
and they appear to be efective in the 
short term. But they will sufocate 
subnational policy initiative, ultimately 
undermining the adaptive capacity of 
the Chinese state.
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Increasingly concerned about rampant corruption in China’s far-lung administrative system 
and unable to tolerate ineicient policy implementation in a slowing economy, the CCP leadership 
was left with little choice but to reorganise central-local relations. In this essay, we consider the 
most prominent measures taken thus far and posit that these measures have indeed signiicantly 
reconigured central-local relations. Our essay includes initial assessments of the impact of in-
dividual reconigurations. We conclude with a general outlook on potential short- and long-term 
developments. 
THE CCP LEADERSHIP UNDER XI REINVIGORATES  
HIERARCHICAL COMMAND STRUCTURES 
Several central-level structural changes have concentrated power in the hands of the top lead-
ership, but the extent to which this has afected central-local relations difers by issue area. The 
Leading Small Group for Comprehensively Deepening Reform (CDRLSG), established shortly after 
the 3rd Plenum and under the direct leadership of Xi Jinping, has had by far the most immediate 
impact on central-local relations and on local operations. The group is meant to supervise reform 
progress in the key policy areas identiied in the 2013 decision and it took over part of the deci-
sion-making powers that originally were vested in other LSGs and the State Council (for details, 
see: Miller 2014). This new centralised steering body is furthermore mirrored at almost every level 
of the governmental hierarchy, as subnational governments established equivalent LSGs on com-
prehensively deepening reform in order to answer to the new extensive central calls. 
Clariication of responsibilities and increased transparency
In March 2013, Li Keqiang announced a major programme for transforming the role of the govern-
ment, including deregulation and streamlining of competencies. as a result, the responsibilities 
and portfolios of various government units are more speciic than ever before. Publicly available 
“power lists” (权力清单) provide an overview of competencies of individual government units. 
They act as a service-oriented reform, intended to accommodate the demands of “clients” (mainly 
citizens and entrepreneurs) for accessibility and procedural transparency (Stepan 2015). arguably, 
however, their real purpose is to increase procedural eiciency, as they signal which organisation-
al units have the necessary competencies (and mandate) to make certain decisions. While the CCP 
likely still considers local experimentation important for policy innovation, it has actually reduced 
subnational governments’ overall discretionary power. This diminishes both zeal for experimenta-
tion and room for innovation.
Cadre evaluation: demotion has turned into a real threat 
Similarly, the central government has introduced more sophisticated policy performance targets 
as part of the reform of the cadre evaluation system. Firstly, compared to previous administrations, 
the most recent programmes with performance targets contain strikingly few binding targets. 
This smaller number of goals – even though the goals themselves may be comparatively di cult 
to achieve – should mean that they are more attainable for local leadership, and the central gov-
ernment has clearly enunciated the absolute necessity of their implementation. at the same time, 
the centre has adjusted the criteria of target contracts and the cadre evaluation system, which 
stretches across all governmental levels. Underscoring the top leadership’s decree that economic 
growth can no longer ofset underperformance in other policy areas. Enhanced monitoring of cad-
res’ performance on priority issues, such as public service provision and environmental protection, 
now accompanies what used to be an almost exclusive focus on GDP growth. 
This all means increased complexity and even heavier burdens for local administrators. If 
they deliver, they can expect to rise. If they fail to do so, the government has a new sanction-
ing mechanism at hand: demotion. Whereas in the past, demotion was rarely used except as a 
tool in party discipline inspection, central guidelines issued in 2015 by the central government 
and transposed by most subnational governments in the meantime, make demotion a real threat 
(SCMP 2015). The recent adaptations may have been necessary to strengthen control over local 
implementation, but they could end up causing opposition among local cadres. 
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RESTRUCTURING LOCAL FINANCES:  
TAPPING NEW SOURCES AS OLD ONES RUN DRY
For more than two decades, subnational governments in China have faced increasing iscal pres-
sure. Unfunded mandates have driven them to search for new sources of income to inance public 
services and infrastructure projects. The new leadership has enumerated even more deliverables 
expected of subnational governments, while simultaneously reducing their sources of income 
through stricter regulation of land sales, real estate deals, and local inancing platforms. Thus the 
question arises: how can the solvency of local governments be guaranteed as they are tasked to 
provide more services with less money? 
Local and central government are searching for new inancial sources
The central government has done little with respect to increasing local governments’ iscal base. 
Instead, it is expanding upon previous adjustments to the intergovernmental transfer system. 
Since 2012 the central government has been increasing the share of general transfers. This marks 
the end of a project-based approach that is built around earmarks for particular projects, trans-
ferred to subnational levels (ahlers 2014). 
While the new system apparently allows subnational governments more lexibility in allocat-
ing the funds they receive from the centre, “managing scarcity” still rules the day, as the amount 
of funding continues to be insuicient. 
Part 2: Leadership Structures and Processes
Figure 5








Local governments under increasing iscal pressure
Central government transfers, local revenue sources and deicits of local governments (2012 – 2016)
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as a solution to this problem, the central government has prescribed a “market-orientation”. 
It is stridently calling on local governments to invoke “social capital”, essentially meaning private 
commitments. This involves donations or corporate social responsibility (CSR) measures from local 
state and private enterprises as well as increased reliance on contractors or “non-governmental 
organisations” to provide services, especially in the health and care sector. 
“Decentralising” market orientation still happening under extreme hierarchy
The strongest symbols of this new market orientation are the new “investment companies” (基
金公司), which act as industry policy vehicles for subsidy allocation, local favourable industry 
schemes, and business project funding and loans at the local level. Former government oicials 
lock to become chairmen of these new institutions. They can be described as “semi-capitalist” 
local agencies, but their priorities are largely set behind the scenes by the enormous top-down 
steering in the background.
Local inances still unsustainable in the long term as implicit debt continues to rise 
Local debts are on the rise. The last oicial release of data on local debt dates to mid-2013. ac-
cording to the national audit oice, debt amounted to CnY 17.9 trillion. The implementation of 
a debt-for-bonds swap programme, allowing local governments to reinance a portion of their 
maturing debts via bond issuances in 2015, is another sign of the dire state of local inances. 
according to a report by the Economist Intelligence Unit, provinces issued around CnY 600 billion 
in new bonds and converted debts worth CnY 3.2 trillion in 2015 alone (cf. EIU 2016).
In addition, the centre has endorsed Public Private Partnerships (PPP) as a panacea for is-
cal gap problems. PPPs might provide local governments with a new source of income to realise 
certain projects, but their use in China and elsewhere has shown that they also create problems 
of their own. Overuse of PPPs carries with it the danger that short-term inancial considerations 
outweigh longer-term ones as the main drivers of PPP establishment. as of now, local govern-
ment priorities and their power over the involved companies are still the more critical factors in 
the setting up of PPPs, overriding the involved companies’ economic considerations.
RIGOROUS PARTY DISCIPLINE INSPECTION PARALYSES 
LOCAL GOVERNMENT ACTIONS
The CCP leadership fears disintegration and has called “decentralism” a major evil. Through the 
several key steps outlined above, the CCP is pushing for increased efectiveness and standardisa-
tion in local-level policy implementation. apparently aware that intensiied pressure on local gov-
ernments could “over-stretch” the system, the central leadership has employed a set of seemingly 
anachronistic tools in an attempt to enforce compliance: a nationwide anti-corruption campaign, 
enhanced discipline inspection, and ideological training.
More frequent and stricter forms of discipline enforcement
at the local level, the pervasiveness of the anti-corruption campaign and its attendant discipli-
nary measures is striking. Over 90 per cent of ousted oicials were cadres at the county level or 
below. high staf turnover levels and recruitment eforts are consuming substantial proportions 
of the remaining experienced oicials’ available time. Furthermore, thorough disciplinary inspec-
tions at these lower levels also means that the actual business of governance often slows for 
weeks at a time, and exchanges with other departments, stakeholders and external advisors 
essentially stops. 
aside from the ever-increasing inspection tours by higher-level organs, discipline supervision 
is also manifesting itself in a more permanent form on the local government level. nearly all local 
departments now host at least one “disciplinary agent” (纪委的) who oversees and screens all 
activities, meetings, inspection tours, publications, etc.
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Using ideology as a means to enforce policy compliance and efectiveness
The CCP no longer values policy efectiveness or pragmatic policy solutions on their own. It now 
requires ideological obedience and ultimate loyalty to the Party’s core values and developmental 
priorities. 
This is relected in reinvigorated ideological training. Leading cadres spend weeks or months 
reciting “core” works in Party school courses and are responsible for holding frequent “study ses-
sions” with their staf. This alienates local administrators from top-level leadership, as they see 
these training sessions as wasting both time and resources. Thus, such ideological measures are 
unlikely to enhance policy efectiveness and implementation in the long run and may in fact pro-
duce the opposite result: an increasing number of experienced local oicials will probably leave 
the civil service, stripping the party-state nexus of its most valuable resource for managing the 
mounting challenges for governing the country.
OUTLOOK: SHORT TERM GAIN, LONG TERM PAIN
Drawing from the initial assessment of these reconigurations, we conclude that the short- and 
long-term prospects of policy efectiveness are quite diferent:
  In the short term, reduced local discretionary power breaks down local circumvention to central 
policies and beneits programme implementation.
  In the long term, unless the centre eases up somewhat on subnational actors and improves 
the iscal basis of local governments, local policy initiative will be completely sufocated. This 
would have signiicant negative implications for the adaptive capacity of the Chinese state and 
its recently improved record in providing public goods. 
Part 2: Leadership Structures and Processes
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Part 2: Leadership Structures and Processes
THE PARTY AS THE NEW LOCUS OF ECONOMIC DECISION-MAKING
Xi Jinping has shifted the locus of economic policy-making sharply, away from the government 
and towards the Communist Party. The groundwork for this shift was laid early in the Xi adminis-
tration by the creation of new Leadership Small Groups (LSGs) with expanded executive author-
ity. The two most important economic LSGs meet every month or two and pass on ten or more 
important policy documents at each meeting. The fact that these Party processes are actually in 
authoritative use has been conirmed by process-tracing of numerous important policy decisions. 
The shift in economic policy process represents a clear break with post-1980 Deng-ist norms, 
which had consistently placed the Premier in charge of economic policy.
This change in the policy process has caused a sharp deterioration in the quality of economic 
policy. There are three main reasons for this deterioration:
1.  The connection between policy-making and policy implementation has been weakened. There 
is no longer a “natural” implementation pathway available for a given policy decision. after 
a policy decision is made, speciication of the policy must be handed of to another agency, 
and the choice of agency is often not obvious. Even then, a further hand-of must usually 
be made to the agency charged with implementation. Moreover, without a single, authorita-
tive policy-maker focused on speciic priority policies, there is no “hammer” to push chang-
es through the system. State-owned enterprise (SOE) reform exempliies these problems. 
 
2.  There is uncertainty about who will make speciic decisions. To be sure, the shift in economic 
policy decision-making to “the Party” means that Xi Jinping himself ultimately makes crucial de-
cisions about economic policy. Current Premier Li Keqiang still oversees day-to-day operation 
of the government. as a result, Li has tremendous inluence on the interpretation of policy and 
the priority given to policies that compete for resources and attention. Who will actually be the 
key decision-maker in a given case? Will the top leader care enough about a speciic policy to 
push for it? nobody knows.
Shifting structures and processes in 
economic policy-making at the centre
Barry Naughton
KEY FINDINGS 
  Xi Jinping has dramatically shifted the 
locus of economic policy-making away 
from the government and towards the 
Communist Party. This means Xi Jinping 
himself ultimately makes crucial deci-
sions about economic policy.
  The decision-making process itself  
is broken. The shift in policy process  
has resulted in policies that are not  
adequately speciied or implemented 
and in erratic and inconsistent policy 
commitment. One plausible conse-
quence of this is a pattern of excess 
caution among lower-level oicials  
with policy responsibilities.
  It is unclear what criteria decision- 
makers will use to evaluate policy  
choices. It is generally believed that 
economic policy is being held hostage  
to an insistence that GDP growth must 
not fall below a 6.5% annual rate, 
because this is crucial to the goal of 
doubling GDP by 2020. This completely 
arbitrary criterion undermines the  
quality of economic policy.
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3.  It is unclear what criteria decision-makers will use to evaluate policy choices. as a result, poli-
cy-making has become more erratic. It is generally believed that economic policy is being held 
hostage to an insistence that GDP growth must not fall below a 6.5% annual rate, because this 
is crucial to the goal of doubling GDP by 2020, which has been embraced by Xi Jinping. This is a 
completely arbitrary criterion that inevitably undermines the quality of economic policy.
In short, the shift in policy process has resulted in policies that are not efectively speciied or 
implemented, and a pattern of erratic and inconsistent policy commitment. One plausible conse-
quence is a pattern of excess caution among lower-level oicials with policy responsibilities.
MANIFESTATIONS OF A BROKEN POLICY PROCESS 
When Xi Jinping initially came to power, many outside observers welcomed the advent of a strong 
leader who could push through necessary economic reforms over the resistance of entrenched 
interest groups. Xi encouraged this perception by (a) talking early and often about the need for 
reform; (b) appointing talented and committed reformers to key positions; and (c) promoting an 
extremely broad and ambitious reform agenda at the Third Plenum in november 2013. Consid-
ering this early commitment, it is quite striking that two and a half years after the Third Plenum, 
not one of its economic reforms has been an obvious success. The disappointment of these early 
hopes calls out for an explanation. The three features described above – lack of implementation 
channels; uncertainty about decision nodes; and uncertainty about criteria and leadership atten-
tion – can contribute to such an explanation. It may also be that the agenda was simply too broad, 
without suicient prioritisation.
Absence of implementation pathway
The absence of clear implementation channels is an obvious problem for all elements of the Third 
Plenum reform package. In theory, the Third Plenum passed a “top-level design” reform programme, 
which was then disaggregated into 336 “initiatives” farmed out to diferent organisations. Par-
celling out responsibilities to many agencies left economic reforms without a strong champion or 
guide. For example, the discussion of State-owned enterprise (SOE) reform raised expectations, 
with intriguing references to mixed ownership, changes in the way national wealth was to be 
managed, and separation of monopoly and public goods irms from those in competitive markets. 
In practice, the Leadership Small Group on Deepening Reform farmed out the drafting of SOE 
reform programmes to three separate agencies: the Ministry of Finance for public wealth man-
agement; the State Council for corporate governance; and the CCP Organisation Department for 
managerial practices. The Ministry of Finance reported back promptly, but their plan was judged 
too radical to get the green light; while the Organisation Department developed a programme to 
limit managerial compensation to norms created by bureaucratic rank and simply enacted it on 
their own. Meanwhile, various interests in the State Council were unable to agree and it was clear 
that the three drafting agencies were heading in very diferent directions. In response, an SOE 
Reform Leadership Drafting Group was eventually set up under the State Council, headed by State 
Councillor Ma Kai, and stafed by Wang Yong, the former head of the state asset management 
agency (SaSaC). We do not know exactly who made all these decisions, but they must have been 
approved by Xi Jinping. In essence, state enterprise reforms were delegated to a drafting group 
dominated by insider interest groups, and the fate of reforms was sealed. It was no surprise to 
anyone when, in September 2015, a fragmentary, disappointing, and in some respects incoherent 
state enterprise reform plan was promulgated.
What happened to the ambitious but amorphous suggestions about state enterprise reform 
in the 2013 Third Plenum Resolution? They were lost because of a procedural decision (when the 
drafting of the detailed programme was delegated to Ma Kai’s group). however, this relected a 
broader problem. Once control over a speciic programme has passed from the Leadership Small 
Group on Deepening Reform to an implementing agency, there is no real champion for more dis-
ruptive and efective reforms. nor is there any “enforcer” who can make sure that reforms are 
taken seriously and entrenched interests are overcome. 
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In January 2016 a front page article in the People’s Daily by “authoritative Personage” an-
nounced the big push in favour of “supply-side structural reforms.” These policies had been ap-
proved by the (Party-organised) economic work conference in December, and clearly represented 
a break away from both the 2013 Third Plenum reform agenda and the business-as-usual ap-
proach of State Council policy-making. The press has also numerous “clues” that the authoritative 
personage is Liu he, oice director of two of Xi Jinping’s key Leadership Small Groups (and, really, 
there is nobody else that it could be anyway). Thus, the article represents an extraordinary inter-
vention by the economic policy adviser closest to Xi Jinping to seize the policy initiative and push 
for faster structural changes. The arguments in the pieces are solid – as are those in a follow-up 
piece on May 6, 2016 – and the policies advanced make sense. however, the intervention is proba-
bly better seen as evidence of a broken policy process. There is a yawning gap between the intent 
of the policies and the identity of the agencies prepared to implement them. Who is to carry out 
supply-side structural reform? The most urgent element of this programme is closing down ex-
cess industrial capacity while protecting the interests of laid-of workers. Only local governments 
can plausibly achieve this, but local governments don’t have the resources or motivation to carry 
out such a demanding task. In practice, local governments are being nudged into implementation 
through a combination of political pressures, incentive payments from the central government, 
and deal-making with large irms that allows irms to form restructuring cartels and absorb small-
scale producers. This exempliies the implementation disconnect that has come to characterise 
Chinese economic policy-making.
Uncertainty about key decision-making
Economist advisers now regularly report uncertainty and frustration about where decisions are 
actually made. This is an inescapable feature of the current decision-making setup. While Xi Jin-
ping has successfully asserted his position as the ultimate decision-maker, he cannot possibly 
pronounce on every important economic policy. In the meantime, Premier Li Keqiang maintains 
a full schedule presiding over daily operation of the government, including many discretionary 
decisions that regularly achieve “policy” status. Who decides whether a policy is decided by Li, as 
part of ordinary economic management, or by Xi, as part of his supreme powers? Xi Jinping does 
not appear to practice “management by exception,” in which he allows Li to manage decisions un-
less something goes wrong, and in any case, the economic challenges facing China are likely too 
complex and deep for this kind of approach to succeed. The result is simply that nobody knows 
when Xi will choose to exercise his discretionary control over decision-making. Interventions are 
hard to predict in advance, and not even clearly known in retrospect. For example, we do not really 
know who was responsible for the bailout of the stock market with more than a trillion CnY of 
public funds.
There are a number of cases where Xi has directly intervened to accelerate or limit the re-
form process, but these are known only through rumour and inference. Pronouncements by Xi 
on farmer land rights, hukou liberalisation, and state enterprise privatisation are said to have put 
limits on the economic reform drafting process. Conversely, Xi is said to have signalled the impor-
tance of completing Free Trade agreements (FTas) with South Korea and australia in time for 
the november 2014 aPEC meetings in Beijing. This message inspired negotiators to push both 
agreements over the inish line in time, accepting several provisions that made the agreements 
more signiicant (especially the australia agreement). however, no similar signal was forthcoming 
with the China-U.S. bilateral investment treaty, with the result that few serious concessions were 
made before Xi’s trip to the U.S. in 2015, and no agreement was reached. More broadly, we cannot 
identify any case since november 2014 where Xi has intervened to push speciic market-oriented 
reforms forward or remove roadblocks to the reform process. 
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Uncertainty over policy criteria
Closely related to the preceding point is the fact that actors are now unsure what the predomi-
nant criteria are for judging efective economic policy. Under Premier Zhu Rongji, it was clear that 
market-oriented reform was the dominant, if not the only, goal of economic policy. Premier Wen 
Jiabao dialled back the commitment to market reforms, but consistently sought to make the gov-
ernment a more efective provider of social services while championing aggressive techno-indus-
trial policies. Today, broadly speaking, three diferent policy agendas jostle for dominance. First, 
market-oriented economic reforms were promised in the 2013 Third Plenum, with a decisive role 
for markets in resource allocation and to “as far as possible eliminate government intervention in 
microeconomic matters.” Second, the structural changes envisaged in the 13th Five Year Plan, and 
particularly the promotion of high technology industry, are seen as the key to creating a sustaina-
ble growth model after the end of the miracle growth phase. Third, Xi Jinping’s distinctive political 
agenda incorporates anti-corruption but also a revived and re-invigorated role for the Communist 
Party and its practices and beliefs. These three agendas are not absolutely contradictory, but they 
relect very diferent underlying value systems and lead to very diferent and sometimes conlict-
ing short-run policy priorities. 
Once again, SOE reform can illustrate. The 2013 Third Plenum document praised employee 
ownership and accelerated stock market listing. Employees of many large central SOEs excitedly 
began preparations for distributing stock options. But in late 2015 these programmes were can-
celled as being inconsistent with the public-spirited Party members Xi has sought to promote. The 
CCP Organisation Department reduced the salaries of large SOE CEOs and board chairmen in both 
industrial and inancial corporations, in pursuit of fairness and a kind of egalitarian principle. Mean-
while, powerful Inspection Teams sent from the Central Commission for Discipline Inspection are 
currently resident at SaSaC and the China Securities Regulatory Commission, and they are quite 
insistent on the high priority managers should accord to their work. This highly politicised agenda 
diverts efort from other di cult tasks. Similarly, the efort to foster new kinds of high tech actors 
is often in tension with the reformist ideal of having government withdraw from microeconomic 
afairs.
The second and third points are closely related. There do not appear to be competing agen-
das that divide, say, Xi Jinping and Li Keqiang. Xi’s main economic adviser Liu he appears to be 
committed to market-oriented reforms and structural change, and so does Li Keqiang. howev-
er, the decision-making process implies that neither one is able to make qualitative progress on 
these agendas, and it is unlikely that either is satisied. There may be many speciic issues that 
separate economic policy-makers, but not a philosophical divide. Ministers who nominally report 
to the Premier in fact have no choice but to look to the Party, to the top leader and to his key 
advisers, for signals about policy decisions. Further down the bureaucratic chain of command, 
oicials must be cautious. Who is making policy? What are the broader objectives which policy 
is trying to achieve? Since these questions do not have immediate answers, subordinates can-
not know how they are being evaluated, and they must be cautious. There is abundant evidence 
that policy-makers feel that grass-roots oicials are too cautious, and unwilling to take risks for 
reform. But who can blame them? The problem is not the grass-roots oicials, but rather the fact 
that the decision-making process itself is broken. Economic policy today is made inconsistently 
and is frequently not implemented. These features help explain an apparent sharp decline in the 
quality of policy outcomes.
Economic policy 
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Figure 6
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Part 2: Leadership Structures and Processes
In november 2015, Xi Jinping initiated a new ive-year PLA reform plan. When fully realised in 
2020, the PLA will have a completely new look. This paper explores the politics of this reform in 
the context of Xi’s political leadership. 
WHAT IS NEW?
The latest round of PLA reform is comprehensive but is centred on ive major changes:
  Overhauling the PLA’s chain of command and control, especially at the apex of power – the 
Central Military Commission – with creation of a supreme joint command headed by Xi himself
  Swapping the military region system with a warzone system 
  Reshaping the PLA force structure by creating an Army headquarters, improving the status of 
the Rocket Force and establishing a new Strategic Support Service 
  Placing the PLA’s legal/discipline institutions under direct CMC control
  Separating military operational and administrative systems in the command chains from the 
warzone level downwards
The overall guidance for the reform is to highlight the need for the preparation of war, aligning 
it with Xi’s shift in emphasis from his predecessor’s focus on preparation to his own focus on 
war. The new CMC system, new Army headquarters and new warzone commandants have been 
institutionalised, with a new personnel line-up, managerial structure and command procedures in 
place to implement Xi’s orders. Six concomitant reform schemes have been announced, including 
the reduction of 300,000 troops, the elimination of all PLA commercial interests, the placing of 
PLA legal/discipline organs under direct CMC control, and the further integration of national de-
fence and civilian industries. 
The People’s Armed Policy (PAP) will also undergo sweeping changes to assume more state 
security missions so as to relieve the standing army of that duty. This marks a major change in 
civil-military relations, reorienting the combat forces more towards external threats. The central 
thrust is to place PAP command more tightly under CMC rather than State Council control. As a 
result, the PLA’s political inluence, embedded in its special relations with the commander-in-chief 
(General Secretary of the CCP), will be boosted amidst intensiied external security challenges. 
Military reform: The politics of  
PLA reorganisation under Xi Jinping
You Ji
KEY FINDINGS 
  The emphasis on CMC chair one-man 
rule, along the lines of a Maoist Polit-
buro/CMC divide, will further fragment 
civilian oversight of People’s Liberation 
Army (PLA) activities.
  Xi’s hands-on approach rebalances  
commander-in-chief intervention and 
PLA autonomy in daily management. 
PLA professionalisation may be afected 
as a result.
  Xi’s personnel management may induce 
factional imbalances among diferent 
oicer groupings with the potential for 
long-term consequences.
  Xi’s political leadership is relected by 
his willingness to solicit CMC support to 
foster Politburo consensus on strategic 
issues. This may open the door for CMC 
intervention in Party (factional) afairs 
and thereby politicise the PLA, with 
profound efects on overall elite politics.
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Politics in command of CMC reforms
The newly established CMC supreme joint command follows Xi’s conceptual guidance for reform: 
the CMC will take overall charge of national defence, unifying the PLA’s operational and adminis-
trative command at the top level, while the two systems will be relatively separate at lower levels. 
Thus CMC authority in the daily management of PLA afairs has been enhanced to an unprece-
dented level, as has Xi’s. 
On the surface, this is meant to enhance military eiciency in preparations for war. Behind it, 
however, is Xi’s strategic move to centralise CMC control over the entire armed forces. This move 
was very much politically motivated. Until recently, the PLA had used a combined CMC/headquar-
ters command system. Although the CMC was ultimately responsible for decisions, the headquar-
ters were also entrusted with major decision-making power in running PLA afairs. They routinely 
issued policies and orders to PLA units in the CMC’s name and on the CMC’s behalf. 
In the previous CMC/headquarters command system the former’s control over policy initia-
tives and processes could be circumvented by the latter, especially when the CMC chair was weak. 
now, the role of headquarters is to implement CMC orders. This kills two birds with one stone. 
First, PLA headquarters, e.g. the Joint Staf Department, and warzone commands, are stripped of 
the authority to make strategic decisions. Second, the CMC chair’s control is more direct and de-
tailed, as it is easier for him to control a small body like the CMC both institutionally and personally 
than to control four giant PLA headquarters.
The key to realising efective control is reiterating the ultimate authority of the CMC chair. 
Institutionally this is about reinforcing the CMC chair responsibility system in running PLA afairs, 
guaranteed by the PRC Constitution and CCP/PLA norms and traditions. This authority was visibly 
eroded by Hu Jintao’s style of chairmanship – reign without rule (统而不治) – that allowed the 
top brass to abuse power without fear. Since the 18th CCP Party Congress, the Politburo has 
issued a number of directives stressing the inviolability of the CMC Chair responsibility system 
and equating it with the Party’s absolute control of the PLA. Senior oicers currently emphasise 
the importance of following and protecting Xi’s authority as CMC chair, as relected by deputy 
commander-in-chief Fan Changlong’s speech at the PLA panel of the 2016 nPC Session: “Firmly 
safeguarding and implementing the CMC chair one-man responsibility system is the crux and pri-
mary mission of the PLA reforms. It is the concrete criteria by which to measure PLA loyalty to the 
Party and embodiment of the PLA’s iron discipline” (March 8).
Enhancing the CMC chair’s responsibility system is always a political act, and it was highlight-
ed each time Mao and Deng perceived an internal challenge to their rule. Clearly, Xi’s reiteration 
of it is more political than military/managerial in that such an endeavour is meant to ensure enor-
mous personal power for the CMC chair. This in turn can be extended to Xi’s control of the Party 
agenda and factional activities, especially when there is major elite disagreement on CCP political 
lines, personnel arrangements (i.e. choice of the successor) and strategic policies.
One speciic move to personalise Xi’s exclusive power has been to provide him with practical 
control of PLA operational command – the highest personal authority that a leader can attain. With 
his personal signature, the CMC chair declares war, deploys troops and presses the nuclear button. 
Mao’s unchallengeable power could be traced to his direct command of soldiers and campaigns in 
wartime. In peacetime, CMC chairs normally delegate the operational aspects of PLA management 
to their trusted deputies, as they spend more time on other top political issues. Xi made himself 
chief of the supreme CMC joint command. He paid his irst inspection visit to the command on 20 
April. By doing so, his commander-in-chief position has been further substantiated. 
Interestingly, despite claims that this new reform has tightened Party control of the gun, 
the long-standing fragmentation of CCP organisational leadership over the PLA has remained 
unimproved as Xi continues to uphold Mao’s formula of “The Politburo run[ning] political afairs 
and the CMC military afairs”. no other civilian Politburo member is authorised to handle PLA af-
fairs and no party organs are allowed to intrude into PLA management, i.e. personnel appoint-
ments and legal/disciplinary afairs. The CMC continues to handle the anti-corruption campaign 
autonomously. There is no doubt that Xi’s personal control over the PLA has been substantially 
enhanced, but this does not necessarily extend to enhanced Party control. There were no PBSC 
members present at any of the big events where Xi announced the reforms. Oicial reportage of 
these occasions did not bother to mention the Politburo, begging the question of whether the 
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decisions were the Politburo’s or the CMC’s alone (though the PBSC had to rubber-stamp them as 
part of Party procedure.) Thus, the CMC’s autonomous operational and administrative authority 
evades civilian oversight.
PLA reform and Xi Jinping’s political leadership
The ongoing CMC reform has further testiied to Xi’s strong political leadership in running China, 
facilitated by an assertive personal style and proving the saying that “leadership matters”. Xi’s po-
litical leadership is in stark contrast to his predecessor’s technocratic obsession that placed great-
er value on bureaucratic consensus and collegiality (not rocking the boat 不折腾) than strategic 
innovation and necessary/inevitable elite debate. This CMC reform provides an excellent case for 
an analysis of Xi’s distinctive dialectics in wielding power by striking a subtle balance between 
initiating bold/controversial reforms with resolve and managing negativity/constraints with avail-
able means, which is a rational way of prioritising major policies within a limited range of options.
Speciically, Xi’s political leadership is relected by the features listed below:
  Calculated risk-taking. To the surprise and amazement of PLA watchers, there has been no 
open debate (the internal debate period being rather short), no experimental trials and no tran-
sitional steps/phases for such a sweeping reform that would overhaul China’s defence system. 
This “big-bang” approach is typical of Xi and is unprecedented in the history of CCP reforms. Xi 
may well recognise the risks of reform failure but still went ahead in a big way.
  Political resolve. Every reform entails taking on vested interests, a source of zero-sum com-
petition within the CCP, and thus requires tremendous personal resolve to carry it through. 
This is particularly true of the conservative PLA. In fact, a number of these reforms have been 
proposed, but not implemented, several times before. For instance, the substitution of the mil-
itary region system for the regional ield army system was tabled during the PLA’s 1983/4 
restructuring but was aborted as even Deng had to yield to pressure from PLA elders and 
commanders who would lose out in such a change. Creation of a CMC supreme joint command 
was suggested to Hu, who simply opted for stability instead of change. Xi’s assertive leader-
ship style relects his conidence to override resistance from within afected PLA interests, i.e. 
losses of at least 120 general positions.
  Strong sense of responsibility and urgency for PLA transformation. Related to political resolve 
is a sense of responsibility and a personal urge for change. Oicial propaganda reports claim 
that without Xi’s reforms, the PLA’s survival would be at risk. However, the fact is that the PLA 
would have grown stronger with or without this reform. Regardless of whether or not such 
exaggerations are part of a media campaign to promote Xi’s personal image, Xi’s bold move to 
bite the bullet is admirable and relects his personal concern about the PLA’s future at a time 
of global military transformation.
  Battleield discipline applied to the control of the gun (a common phrase in the ield of Chinese 
civil-military relations). The ongoing reforms are driven by the need to heighten war prepara-
tion and combat readiness as the PLA moves into a sub-war state of afairs. Politically applying 
combat discipline in running the PLA can be a lot more efective in tightening oicer obedi-
ence, soldier morale and troop cohesion than peacetime persuasion. Xi’s style of command is 
heavily inluenced by the First Field Army tradition, whose commander Marshal Peng Dehuai 
and Political Commissar Xi Zhongxun (Xi’s father) adopted the “three-kill” practice to extract 
oicer-corps’ compliance. When this is applied in an anti-corruption campaign, it is particularly 
forceful.
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PLA REFORM AND XI JINPING’S SUCCESSION DESIGN
All of these elements expose a distinctive style of leadership, embedded in an assertive personal-
ity, that makes Xi a diferent commander-in-chief than his predecessors. This is part and parcel of 
his political leadership. One additional feature that may inform the nature of Xi’s political leader-
ship more clearly and at a strategic level is Xi’s inclination to leverage the newly-reorganised PLA 
in CCP/PLA personnel/factional politics. 
The latest PLA reforms open a big window for a leadership reshule that would allow Xi to 
further increase his support in the PLA. Establishing a personal core in the top brass has been a 
major feature of Xi’s political leadership, driven by both an institutional and a personal imperative, 
as well as by the lesson he quickly learned from Hu’s loss of control over succession arrangements 
in 2012. Politburo member selection is ultimately done through the PBSC collective leadership’s 
votes. Such Party norms have created the institutional imperative to forge groups. Without a solid 
grouping of his own, Hu did not have the votes to realise his personnel preferences. Ultimately, Xi’s 
power play will be safeguarded by his control of the voting process at the apex of power, through 
factional backing. Xi’s factional support is fundamental to realising his desire to be a transfac-
tional leader and prevents elite resistance to his personnel and policy initiatives. Xi’s structured 
personal following (班底) in the CMC is the precondition for him to initiate bold PLA reforms. On 
this basis, a CMC consensus on the personnel line-up of the 19th CMC can be easily attained. This 
in turn will strengthen Xi’s hand in choosing his successor or ensuring a third term if necessary.
And time is pressing for Xi to do so. The 6th CCP Plenum in October 2016 will formally mark 
the 19th Congress, a moment of political succession. A supportive military leadership has to be 
erected prior to this moment. This is the personnel context of the PLA reform in a political sense. 
In a way, PLA support is essential for Xi to translate his historical ambition into reality: Mao inlu-
enced China for the irst 30 years of the PRC, Deng the next 30 years, and Xi the 30 years after. 
now Xi is free to construct his team of PLA leadership. Speciically, a reshule has been made 
possible in the following areas:
  The 18th CMC is a transitional team, with nearly half the membership stepping down in two 
years. Xi’s reform has laid down a stepping stone for their replacement. This is particularly true 
of deputy commander-in-chief Fan, not originally Xi’s man. His replacement is emerging in the 
person of Xu Qiliang, who has been put in charge of this round of reform on Xi’s behalf.
  The appointment of the Army chief, commanders of ive warzones, the Strategic Support Ser-
vice and the new legal/discipline commissioner serve as likely candidate pools for the next CMC 
membership. Xi exercised inal say in their selection and structured the appointments into the 
formation of the next CMC.
  The reshule of oicers at the corps level has been extensive. Some appointees have entered 
the CMC cadre reserve list. This allows Xi to have his men in the CMC well beyond his retirement 
in 2022.
MEANS, ENDS AND CONSEQUENCES
The PLA reorganisation has accelerated the tempo of Xi’s power consolidation, centralisation and 
personalisation. Xi’s political leadership beneits the CCP by compensating for the inadequacies of 
post-Deng power institutionalisation, which cannot prevent zero-sum power struggles at the top 
levels. Xi’s resolute style makes it extremely di cult for any challengers to emerge in the Polit-
buro. Politburo and CMC unity are maintained by whatever means can be translated into relatively 
smooth policy-making, handling of corrupt oicials, tackling of vested interest groups and so on. 
Granting Xi a level of unprecedented power has been the CCP’s and PLA’s method for dealing with 
the structural problems accumulated during Hu’s weak leadership. Yet this consensus is only a 
means, not an end. In the CCP system, however, means easily turn into ends. It is inevitable when a 
top leader accumulates a huge amount of personal authority. The means-ends switch will reverse 
the post-Deng CCP efort on power institutionalisation. The ongoing PLA reforms may further 
this tendency.
The latest PLA 
reforms open 
a big window 
for a leadership 
reshule that 
would allow 
Xi to further 
increase his  
support in the 
PLA.
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  The emphasis on CMC chair one-man rule, along the lines of a Maoist Politburo/CMC divide, will 
further fragment civilian oversight of PLA activities.
  Xi’s PLA reform has further narrowed State Council functions in military afairs, i.e. national 
mobilisation and PAP administration.
  Xi’s hands-on approach, as opposed to Hu’s hands-of style, reorients the commander-in-chief’s 
routine intervention and PLA autonomy in daily management. Thus, PLA professionalisation 
may be afected.
  Xi’s personnel management may induce factional imbalances among diferent oicer group-
ings, with the potential for long-term destabilisation.
  Xi’s political strength is based on CMC support, which is helpful for him in generating Politburo 
consensus over strategic issues. This may open the door for CMC intervention in Party (faction-
al) afairs and may politicise the PLA, with profound efects on overall elite politics.
This list of challenges derived from Xi’s particular leadership style is not exhaustive, but rather 
touches on only a subset of issues that Xi watchers should concentrate on at present. It is still too 
early to conclude that Xi will repeat Mao’s strong man-style leadership, given that he is still irmly 
subject to a two-term restriction. What is certain, however, is that uncertainty lies ahead as an 
inherent component of Xi’s political leadership.
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HEADING TOWARDS UBIQUITOUS MASS SURVEILLANCE
China is about to become a forerunner and innovator in IT-based ubiquitous mass surveillance. 
Information technology and the internet are fundamentally disrupting traditional economic and 
social structures in China, as in many other countries worldwide. China is reaping massive econom-
ic beneits from this development. At the same time, the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) employs 
these technologies as tools for the surveillance and regulation of society. Pervasive censorship 
and control of the internet are an omnipresent reality in China, with the state putting much efort 
into improving its ability to control content and social interaction on- and oline. After coming 
into power, the Xi Jinping leadership tightened online control tremendously, creating the most 
efective and rigid system of control yet. Western hopes over the liberalisation of China through 
the internet have ultimately vanished.
China is no exception when it comes to the control of the internet and the use of IT-based 
surveillance techniques. Even democracies such as the U.S. and European countries censor spe-
ciic online content or detect crimes by analysing the data of citizens’ online activities. Yet China’s 
leadership is heading towards something larger: an all-encompassing system of penetrating, con-
trolling and shaping society.
AMBITIOUS GOAL: CIVILISING CHINA WITH INFORMATION TECHNOLOGIES
To China’s leaders, information technologies appear to be a solution for a whole set of problems: 
they regard information technologies as presenting a unique opportunity to increase the level of 
compliance with laws, regulations and social norms by individuals and companies, to lower the risk 
of social and economic instability and, ultimately, to maintain political control and authority. Ubiq-
uitous mass surveillance (Schneier 2015) with the help of cutting-edge information technologies 
is to be the basis for this.
IT-backed authoritarianism: 
Information technology enhances central authority and 
control capacity under Xi Jinping
Mirjam Meissner and Jost Wübbeke
KEY FINDINGS
  China’s leadership under Xi Jinping sees 
information technologies as providing 
an opportunity for ubiquitous mass  
surveillance. It will increasingly use 
information technology as a political 
instrument of automatic and real-time 
control to perfectly enforce laws  
and regulation and to make human  
behaviour conform to the social norms 
laid down by the Chinese Communist 
Party. The ultimate aim is to create  
a “civilised” society.
  China is on its way to developing an IT-
backed authoritarianism. The increasing 
utilisation of IT systems strengthens 
the central authority and control  
capacity of the Chinese leadership.
  China is a global pioneer of ubiquitous 
mass surveillance including the under-
lying IT systems linking and analysing 
multiple data sets and various channels 
of mass surveillance at the same time. 
China’s IT-backed authoritarianism will 
become an attractive role model and 
technology provider for other authori-
tarian countries.
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Surveillance by the Chinese state is not a new phenomenon, nor is surveillance of the inter-
net. But the Chinese plans go much further: the Chinese leadership makes eforts to increasingly 
link surveillance systems, making them as all-encompassing and real-time as possible. This will 
turn the formerly separated surveillance mechanisms into an internet of surveillance, with the 
merger of former data islands into one single platform at the centre. The internet of surveillance 
will link surveillance systems built up by the government like traic monitoring, or inancial credit 
rating, as well as existing databases from the education system, the judicial system or the health 
sector. At the same time, the system will integrate data from company surveillance systems that 
were originally used for advertisement or other commercial reasons like online shopping data, 
data on social media activities, or positioning and mobility data gathered via apps or smartphones. 
Companies like Alibaba, Tencent or Baidu develop these systems and will provide the data for the 
state (Wang et al. 2015).
This will ultimately build an all-encompassing data set encompassing every individual, com-
pany and organisation based in or closely related to China. In order to link identities across data 
sets, every individual and company will have a unique number to identify, analyse and score rele-
vant data. 
This is not yet reality. Setting up data sets of such massive scale and constructing related IT 
infrastructure is a highly ambitious and challenging endeavour. But the Chinese leadership under 
Xi Jinping has made it a political priority: it has released a whole set of political programmes and 
measures to this end since 2014. A number of pilot projects on both province and company levels 
test relevant systems and technologies. Related regulations and technical standards have been 
formulated or are about to be released. 
These activities show the ultimate goal behind the CCP’s agenda: to “civilise” Chinese society. 
The government’s plans go far beyond surveillance, data mining and building up all-encompassing 
data sets. China’s leaders not only want to see what people do at any given time, they also want 
to inluence their behaviour. In order to do so, they massively invest in algorithms analysing mass 
data (Big Data). A deeper look into China’s agenda and implementation activities for the “Social 
Credit System” (SCS), which is currently being built up, reveals how this is supposed to function. 
INFLUENCING BEHAVIOUR WITH SOCIAL CREDIT SCORING
The SCS is conceptualised as a system that will mainly utilise data on two types of entities: com-
panies and individuals. For both, companies and individuals, the SCS is intended to ensure that only 
those who respect the rules and norms of the CCP, who contribute to China’s political goals and 
who behave in a socially, ecologically and economically responsible manner can fully participate in 
the Chinese market and be an equal member of Chinese society. In case of severe violation, com-
panies or individuals will be put on blacklists and excluded from activities on the Chinese market or 
have their access to public services restricted. With the SCS for companies already fairly advanced 
in some sectors, it has become clear that Corporate Social Responsibility in China might soon no 
longer be a matter of voluntary action. For individuals, the pilot schemes of the SCS suggest that 
the system will pervade the realm of personal freedom, linking data from social platforms, online 
content, judgement on norm-conforming behaviour by employers, education background and con-
sumer preferences, among others.
The SCS builds on and reinforces the basic principle of surveillance: its pure existence already 
inluences behaviour. If people assume they are being observed, they behave diferently – con-
forming to existing rules or whatever they deem “right”. China’s SCS creates a system of incentives 
for good behaviour (“nudging”) and disadvantages for non-compliance. 
This goes far beyond inancial credit scoring systems in Western countries. The basic idea, 
though, is similar. In addition to much broader collection of data from government and business 
sources, the Chinese SCS difers in one key aspect: it links the evaluation of economic and inancial 
activities with an assessment of rule compliance and “socially responsible” behaviour as deined 
by the Chinese leadership. The SCS will serve as an additional mechanism to the judicial system, 
striking where it seems to hurt people and companies most: at their economic and individual free-
dom. In contrast to traditional means of governance such as violence and coercion, this system 
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will be much subtler and almost invisible. It embeds political goals within algorithms and within a 
digital environment which seems natural to the user. To them, it appears as if they were just using 
another valuable online service, not recognising any of the political goals behind the system.
This will have a signiicant impact on everyone’s daily life in China: under the SCS your driv-
ing habits, based on real-time monitoring of your car, might, for example, inluence your personal 
credit scoring, and if you are a professional driver it might even inluence the credit scoring of 
your company. Your company might not be able to participate in the next round of public tender 
because you drove too fast or because emission targets were missed – evaluated by real-time 
emission monitoring. Your neighbour, at the same time, with an excellent credit proile not only 
gets a visa faster than you but can also apply for attractive jobs you could never apply for. And he 
might consider not being friends with you anymore, because this lowers his credit score and he 
does not want to run the risk of losing his attractive job.
Many Chinese ind the idea of a Social Credit System very appealing. They accept the Chi-
nese leadership’s approach because they feel there is a high level of distrust and antisocial be-
haviour within Chinese society. Critical voices on the SCS are rare. Many people seem especially to 
appreciate the idea of impeding the activities of companies that are not complying with rules and 
not fulilling social standards, for example with regards to emissions of pollutants or work safety. 
In some aspects, the plans of the Chinese leadership for inluencing human behaviour with 
the help of ubiquitous mass surveillance might indeed have positive efects on China’s economic 
and social development. The most problematic part of the plans, however, is that the CCP alone 
determines what is “good” and “bad” behaviour. The plans, for example, explicitly include the pro-
iling and scoring of lawyers, teachers, journalists and non-governmental organisations based on 
their conformity to norms as deined by the party. nevertheless, it remains vague what norm 
conformity will mean for a lawyer or a journalist under the SCS. Past directives for such groups 
would strongly suggest that ideological loyalty will be a decisive factor. In one way or another, the 
SCS will further restrain the individual and economic freedom of those who do not fully share the 
goals and opinions of the CCP.
CHINA’S IT-BACKED AUTHORITARIANISM STRENGTHENS CENTRAL AUTHORITY 
AND CONTROL CAPACITY
It is nothing new that the CCP prosecutes opponents of the party or people who might endanger 
the stability of the country. If, however, the linking of data sets and surveillance systems is fully 
implemented, as the Chinese leadership’s plans propose, it will catapult the control capacity of the 
Chinese leadership into a whole new sphere of eiciency, closing the last niches for any behav-
iour and opinion deviating from the CCP’s norms. China is on its way to developing an IT-backed 
authoritarianism strengthening the Chinese state with information technologies, leaving little or 
no room for disobedient activities by companies or individuals.
This is due to the fact that algorithms minimise the inluence of the most important factor of 
uncertainty: human decisions. Algorithms can evaluate people’s behaviour 24 hours a day based 
on principles decided upon by the CCP. This reduces the role of human biases, case-to-case deci-
sions and the danger of corruption. In addition, it strengthens the direct control of the CCP with-
out depending on intermediaries like public oicials, courts or the police. Finally, the utilisation of 
real-time surveillance systems provides the possibility for immediate or even automatic response 
and control measures.
Simultaneously, the linking of data sets enhances the authority of the central state vis-á-vis 
subnational governments and companies. Under China’s IT-based surveillance system the distri-
bution of power will be decided by the ownership of data, and the only owner of a complete set 
of data will be the central state. All data collected, analysed and used in China will be sent to or 
exchanged with central government databases. The central state puts itself in a position to see 
the whole picture of how people, companies and other organisations act, what they currently do 
or might plan to do in the future. At the same time, it will leave provinces as well as companies in a 
position to share their information with the government and receive – as a reward and to develop 
new business models with the help of government data – additional information back in return, 
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while still not getting a grasp of the complete picture. The central government will be the only 
entity to have full and regular access to all available data without needing to hack into company 
systems or to have secret backdoor agreements. 
China’s IT-backed authoritarianism will, however, impede political and social progress and 
could even hinder technological innovation, since deviation from the norm is sometimes indispen-
sable for the development of new political, social, technological or economic approaches. norm 
conformity might engender trust and good behaviour within Chinese society, but perfect security 
systems and law enforcement would lead to stagnation in the long term since people would never 
dare to act in contravention of the established normative framework.
REALITY CHECK: IMPLEMENTATION REMAINS CHALLENGING BUT POSSIBLE
How rigid and efective China’s IT-backed authoritarianism will become strongly depends on the 
implementation of the planned IT and scoring systems. Up to now, implementation has been rapid, 
especially compared to progress in other policy areas, but technological and political challenges 
are still signiicant: linking existing data sets and surveillance systems is as much of a technical 
challenge as the introduction of new IT systems and the analysis of such massive amounts of 
data. Despite rapid technological progress, it remains questionable whether China has the neces-
sary technological capabilities. Political challenges are substantial as well, since the integration 
of provincial- or ministerial-level data into a consistent central government database is not only a 
matter of technology but also a matter of power distribution.
China’s central leadership can, however, build upon the support of private Chinese companies 
like Baidu, Alibaba and Tencent – and many other less well-known enterprises. They are willing 
and able to provide their cutting-edge IT systems and data analytics for political purposes. In 
return they beneit from new business opportunities related to the commercial use of parts of 
the governmental databases. This win-win situation leaves China in an excellent starting position 
for its ambitious plans for IT-based ubiquitous mass surveillance. If no severe external shock or 
economic crisis occurs, efective implementation of China’s plans is realistic. It will, however, also 
strengthen the economic power and political inluence of IT companies in China.
CHINA WILL BECOME AN ATTRACTIVE ROLE MODEL  
FOR AUTHORITARIAN COUNTRIES
China is a global pioneer for IT-based ubiquitous mass surveillance. Although many countries col-
lect massive amounts of data on their citizens, no other country has such comprehensive and am-
bitious plans for the linking of databases or for nudging people towards changing their behaviour.
Individual IT-based surveillance systems in other countries usually focus on single areas of 
people’s lives or companies’ activities without institutionalised exchange of data and with data 
ownership typically highly fragmented: Google having data on activities on Google platforms, 
Facebook data on activities on its social platform; a pay-as-you-go car insurance company having 
data on its customers, and another insurance company having a similar set of data; but all these 
data sets are not linked with one another or even shared with government agencies.
The only exceptions are, of course, intelligence and security services, which gather all infor-
mation and presumably have a complete overview of all data – but which usually do not use this to 
inluence ordinary people’s behaviour as long as they are not suspected of a crime, although they 
would have the technological ability and data to misuse the power they have. In democratic coun-
tries, however, the judicial system – at least theoretically – stands above intelligence and security 
agencies and has the power to balance and control their activities. In China, the CCP is the only 
authority deining what is “wrong” and deciding on how to use the data it collects. 
In contrast to Western intelligence services like the nSA, China’s leadership openly claims 
ownership and usage rights for all data in China. While, for example, data on a company level will 
continue to be separate between companies, many already exchange their data with the central 
state on an institutionalised, non-secretive basis. The central state, at the same time, will have 
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an enormous database and a comprehensive overview of the activities of citizens and companies 
which many intelligence services worldwide would dream of. 
This massive database, together with the ambition of China’s leaders to inluence human 
behaviour, will lead to the development of unique IT systems and Big Data tools proiling and 
scoring people and institutions. From a technological as well as from a political perspective, these 
systems will be highly attractive for other authoritarian countries since they enable the strength-
ening of authority in a subtle but highly eicient way. This especially refers to authoritarian coun-
tries in Asia and the Arab World. Under the catchphrase “digital silk road” China’s political strategy 
already envisions closer cooperation in both regions. If China successfully implements its strategy 
for IT-based ubiquitous mass surveillance, it might become the hub and starting point for the 
digitisation of authoritarian rule in other authoritarian countries.
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INTRODUCTION
In late February 2014, local Beijing media outlets carried a brief article noting the detention of a 
municipal oicial, Liang Ke, on graft charges. Against the backdrop of the substantial wave of ar-
rests occurring at that time in conjunction with President and Chinese Communist Party (CCP) Gen-
eral Secretary Xi Jinping’s withering anti-corruption efort, Liang’s arrest hardly seemed notable. But 
it turned out that Liang was much more unique than the thousands of “tigers and lies” – CCP code 
for high- and low-ranking cadres, respectively, netted in the anti-graft crackdown – that were being 
felled on what seemed like a daily basis. Since 2008, Liang had served as the head of the Beijing 
State Security Bureau, the crown jewel in the Ministry of State Security’s (MSS) network of local 
oices in each of China’s provincial level and municipal jurisdictions. Judging from public records, at 
least, Liang’s arrest marked the irst time such a senior sitting oicial in China’s shadowy internal 
security apparatus had been removed from oice since the formal creation of the MSS in 1983. 
But, it turned out, President Xi was just getting started. Just short of a year later, Ma Jian, a 
MSS vice minister and its long-serving head of counterintelligence, was detained on suspicion of 
graft in January 2015. Speculation concerning the reason for Ma’s arrest ran the gamut from his 
alleged association with the grandest “tiger” bagged by Xi thus far – former Politburo Standing 
Committee (PBSC) member and internal security czar Zhou Yongkang – to his links to a corrupt 
businessman. Regardless of the motivation, Ma’s fall sent a shockwave through China’s vast secu-
rity apparatus by putting the guardians of the CCP regime on notice that no one was beyond the 
reach of Xi’s anti-corruption crusade.
Reshaping China’s “Deep State”: Xi and the security organs
President Xi’s assault on China’s security services:  
Grasping tightly the key levers of power
Christopher K. Johnson
KEY FINDINGS
  Xi Jinping’s relentless purge of the 
regime’s security services is not simply 
a crass political power play. It likely 
relects his deeply-held convictions 
about the nature of power within the 
CCP and the security services’ status as 
a tool – and occasionally a weapon – to 
be wielded by the Party. 
  Though many details remain unclear, 
several major anti-corruption cases 
against security oicials generally sug-
gest that the conduct of the security 
organs had become a liability to the 
CCP and to Xi. It seems that, at mini-
mum, these organs were sufering from 
an organisational fragmentation that 
could damage the integrity of a Leninist 
authoritarian system like China’s. At 
worst, they may have been conducting a 
substantial, if not coordinated, efort to 
at least constrain Xi’s rapid consolidation 
of power.
  Given the potential implications of such 
challenges, Xi’s response has been 
decidedly measured and calculating, and 
not whimsical or tyrannical as is so often 
suggested by foreign observers.
  A troubling side efect of the crackdown 
is the increasing assertiveness among 
security services keen to prove their 
loyalty and efectiveness to President 
Xi. Extraterritorial renditions of regime 
critics or corrupt oicials now seem par 
for the course, but overenthusiastic 
security organs may prove too prone to 
miscalculation at a time when China is 
entering a period of sustained political 
and economic volatility.
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Many China-watchers have posited that Xi’s assault on the security services was simply a 
manifestation of his efort to consolidate power by destroying a key political iefdom of his senior 
party baron rivals. While the method, the sweeping anti-corruption purge, may have been some-
what novel, the motive was an old one – pure power politics, if carried out by other means. Others 
have suggested that Xi has taken a substantial political risk, both personally and systemically, by 
taking on such a powerful regime constituency. They note that this is especially true in light of 
Xi’s parallel attack on another pillar of the regime’s security establishment, the People’s Liberation 
Army (PLA). If Xi pushes too hard, according to this line of reasoning, he risks a ierce backlash from 
institutions that, under the “fragmented authoritarianism” that has deined China’s party-state 
over the last several decades, are too inluential, and too entrenched, to sit idly by while Xi neu-
ters their power. Implicit in such analyses, therefore, is the notion that Xi’s actions are those of a 
potentially reckless leader whose lust for power could cause the CCP to break apart.
By contrast, this paper will argue that Xi’s sweeping assault on the regime’s security servic-
es and its broader control machinery was entirely logical and necessary. Xi perceived that these 
institutions – having run amok under the laccid leadership of his predecessor, former President 
Hu Jintao – posed an existential threat to the cohesion of the CCP’s Leninist authoritarian system. 
This paper will also demonstrate that, rather than simple political gamesmanship or impishness, 
Xi’s behaviour was informed by his personal assessment of what it takes to run the CCP efec-
tively and may have been rooted in his perception of a stalking threat to the long-term stability of 
his succession to the apex of CCP power. Thus, Xi’s actions, rather than relecting the whimsy of 
a power-mad megalomaniac, were methodical and taken in a controlled, stepwise fashion, limiting 
the likelihood of miscalculation that could spark broader leadership instability. Finally, the paper 
will discuss the implications of Xi’s crackdown on the security services and what it may mean for 
how this critical regime xitong may behave and be governed going forward.
XI’S TRADITIONALIST APPROACH TO WIELDING PARTY POWER
In many ways, Xi’s ascendancy in the leadership marks the return of a more traditional style of 
Chinese ruler in the mould of CCP strongmen Mao Zedong and Deng Xiaoping. Several factors 
have contributed to Xi’s mind-set in this regard, but there are a few critical building blocks that 
merit special attention here. First, Xi’s “princeling” status as the ofspring of one of the regime’s 
founding fathers imbues him with a supremely conident, “born to rule” political style that tel-
egraphs a unique understanding of the nature of power within the CCP. Xi’s critical formative 
experiences – the headiness of a privileged upbringing after the CCP’s successful seizure of power 
in 1949 combined with the tumult stemming from his family’s fall from grace in the chaos of the 
Cultural Revolution (1966 –76) – seem to have left him with the view that he is operating in a high-
ly Hobbesian political environment with very few formal rules, and therefore little predictability 
or safety. Consequently, Xi’s operational style appears to be that of a winner-take-all approach to 
the rough-and-tumble world of Chinese Politburo politicking.
Against that backdrop, Xi embraces the notion that, in a Leninist political system like China’s, 
the top leader must personally control the key levers of power to efectively wield authority. Xi’s 
aggressive eforts to establish his direct inluence over the PLA, the security services, and the 
party bureaucracy all speak to his appreciation of this central organising principle of the regime. In 
Xi’s worldview, then, there is no room for the consensus-driven, institutional bargaining approach 
that characterised the administrations of Hu Jintao and his predecessor, former President Jiang 
Zemin. Instead of powerful, highly autonomous iefdoms – described variously by diferent China 
scholars as “the control cartel” (Shirk 2008) or “the iron quadrangle” (Shambaugh 2012) – Xi views 
these institutions as instruments to be wielded in an unlinchingly hierarchical world of CCP power 
and control. In fact, Xi’s approach would seem to suggest that the notion that the CCP was on 
some sort of pathway toward inexorable institutionalisation was a fallacy, and, at least from his 
vantage, the exception to the rule.
Moreover, if Xi had any doubts with regard to the wisdom of his approach, serving for ive 
years as understudy to Hu Jintao must only have airmed his convictions. Under Hu, these institu-
tions took advantage of their particular monopolies mainly on expertise and information control. 
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They established vast operational grey areas within which they were able to exert substantial 
autonomy and therefore outsize policy inluence, even as they were still ultimately subordinate 
to party control. One need only look to the numerous occasions during Hu’s tenure – China’s 2007 
ASAT test, its 2011 test light of the PLA’s prototype J-20 stealth ighter during a visit of then U.S. 
Defence Secretary Robert Gates, etc. – wherein it seemed Hu had little control over, and perhaps 
even less awareness of, what his military was doing. Similarly, Zhou Yongkang, with his iron grip 
over the regime’s vast security and intelligence bureaucracy, seemed to wield power and inlu-
ence far beyond what his bottom-ranked position on the then nine-member PBSC might have 
suggested. His apparent decision to initially buck a clear PBSC consensus to purge fallen Politburo 
member Bo Xilai, for example, highlighted his sense of empowerment. To be fair, Hu’s struggles in 
establishing his authority probably had much more to do with Jiang Zemin’s eforts to hamstring 
that process rather than with a lack of awareness on Hu’s part of the importance of doing so. 
Still, Xi’s seeming sense of urgency immediately upon taking power and his willingness to expend 
great amounts of capital to redress this imbalance highlighted his understanding that Hu’s timid-
ity had done substantial damage to the authority of the oice of the CCP general secretary and 
therefore risked undermining the overall stability of the system. 
A LEGITIMATE RESPONSE TO ORGANISATIONAL FRAGMENTATION … 
The ultimate details remain (probably permanently) cloaked behind the veil of oicial CCP secrecy 
and opacity. However, a review of what little the regime has revealed about the activities of the 
main “tigers” detained under Xi’s anti-graft campaign, along with some simple deduction relating 
to the basic mechanics of a Leninist authoritarian system such as China’s, strongly suggest that 
Xi’s actions represent an understandable and reasoned response to a pervasive threat rather than 
a risky political gambit for his own self-aggrandisement. In each case, the “tiger” in question was 
managing a key element of the CCP’s ecosystem of control, but through some combination of 
corruption and personal vainglory was doing so in ways meant to advance his personal interests 
at the expense of the authority of the top leader. By way of brief review, Zhou Yongkang, through 
his seat on the PBSC and his position as secretary of the CCP’s Political Science and Law Commis-
sion (PSLC), oversaw the regime’s sprawling coercive apparatus. This apparatus was the putative 
guardian of the regime – analogous to KGB’s role as the “sword and shield” of the state in the 
former Soviet Union. While primarily tasked with tracking and subverting perceived enemies of the 
state – both within China and from abroad – the security bureaucracy also maintains a domestic 
monitoring function that can even be turned on members of the top leadership when deemed 
necessary. Therefore, assuring the loyalties of the oicials overseeing the portfolios like Liang 
Ke’s and Ma Jian’s are critical to the top leader’s hold on power.
Similarly, PLA “tigers” Xu Caihou and Guo Boxiong oversaw the military’s personnel system 
and its operational forces, respectively. Both were members of the full Politburo and the top uni-
formed oicers on the CCP’s Central Military Commission (CMC), China’s ultimate military deci-
sion-making body. As such, they made up two points of the triangle – the apex being the party 
chief and CMC chairman – that constitutes the linkage between CCP and the PLA. This setup is 
particularly important in China’s Leninist system in that the PLA is the armed wing of the CCP 
rather than the national military of China. As such, the PLA’s main function is to serve as the 
ultimate guarantor of continued Party rule, as demonstrated most dramatically during the 1989 
Tiananmen crackdown. The fact that Guo and Xu – through the selling of oice and military rank – 
were efectively creating a private army loyal to them within the Party’s army must have seemed 
intolerable to the party chief.
Finally, Ling Jihua, the former chief lieutenant of Hu Jintao and the director of the CCP General 
Oice, also was running a seemingly independent kingdom. The role of the director of the CCP 
General Oice is highly sensitive, best described as the nerve centre of the Politburo. The General 
Oice and its director oversee critical responsibilities, including setting the calendar and agen-
da for meetings of the Politburo and the PBSC, managing paper low within those same bodies, 
and overseeing the personal security of top leaders as well as the compounds and facilities in 
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what analo gous to a chief of staf in western systems. Accordingly, there are few more important 
functional oices in the CCP hierarchy. It is unclear to what degree, if at all, Hu Jintao was aware 
of Ling’s corrupt activities, which may say more about Hu than it does about Ling.
… AND POSSIBLY A MORE PERSONAL CHALLENGE
There has been some speculation that the threat from these individuals may have gone beyond 
just institutional fragmentation or laxity, and instead could have represented a danger to Xi’s very 
succession. Hong Kong and western media accounts have been rife with stories alleging various 
conspiracies among these actors, perhaps even amounting to a “new Gang of Four” (or ive de-
pending on whether and how one counts Bo Xilai) in a reference to Mao’s key henchmen during 
the Cultural Revolution (Bo Zhiyue 2015). While such notions almost certainly are overblown, it is 
not outside the realm of possibility that these oicials, while not coordinating their eforts, may 
have been working toward the shared goal of disrupting, or at least constraining, Xi’s rise.
The oicial accounts, of course, largely are silent on such matters, though, in the cases of 
both Zhou and Ling, there is an intriguing reference to the misuse of state secrets among the list 
of their various ofenses. There is little doubt that Zhou at some point was colluding with Bo Xilai, 
who, given his fellow princeling pedigree, Xi likely perceived as his only legitimate rival for the top 
leadership. Zhou was in a position to order the likes of Ma Jian and Liang Ke to gather damaging 
information on Xi, as some reports have suggested. It is equally clear that Guo and Xu had served 
as the instruments for Jiang Zemin to retain a strong hand in military afairs, to the detriment of 
Hu Jintao’s ability to consolidate power. It is not inconceivable, then, that the substantial networks 
of supporters in the PLA that would endure beyond their stepping down from formal oice could 
represent a similar handicap for Xi. With regard to Ling Jihua, he would have had substantial sway 
in managing key personnel-related processes in his role as General Oice chief. This includes the 
coordination of the lists of candidates for the CCP central committee and the “straw polls” the 
leadership reportedly conducted to rank candidates for the Politburo in the run-up to the 17th and 
18th Party Congresses.
A MEASURED, CALCULATING APPROACH
Viewed in the light of the possible magnitude of such developments, Xi’s approach to managing 
the challenge seems much more rational than whimsical or tyrannical. The roots of his response 
can be traced to the decision at the 2012 18th Party Congress – which witnessed his ascension as 
top leader – to downgrade Zhou Yongkang’s security responsibilities from a PBSC-level portfolio 
to one managed by a member of the full Politburo. Meng Jianzhu succeeded Zhou as the secretary 
of the PSLC, but did not rise to the PBSC with the contraction of that body from nine members 
to seven. Though he may have had little choice in the matter, Xi’s apparent willingness to accept 
Meng – a well-known acolyte of Jiang Zemin – in the post also would seem to speak to his pragma-
tism, and perhaps to a well-honed mastery of political stagecraft by not tipping his hand too early. 
Then, at the november 2013 Third Plenum of the 18th Central Committee, Xi decided to include in 
the public “Decision” document the fact that the PLA would undergo a substantial structural reor-
ganisation, a prelude to the sweeping changes to the PLA’s command system that were rolled out 
starting in early 2016. These changes serve to enhance Xi’s personal control of the PLA, a subject 
that is discussed in greater depth elsewhere in this volume. Similarly, Xi did not rush to round up 
the major tigers in a night-of-the-Long-Knives-like pogrom, but rather dribbled out the cases at a 
measured pace over the course of nearly two years. 
The purpose of reviewing this chronology is to suggest the possibility that Xi’s actions may 
reveal him to be a patient, calculating leader rather than the potentially unsteady risk taker his 
loudest critics warn of. His apparent approach also hints that he is a leader who understands his 
limits and, while brooking no challenge to his authority, has no taste for all-out factional warfare. 
Getting to the bottom of this puzzle has signiicant implications for evaluating the risks to leader-
ship cohesion entailed in Xi’s approach. The success with which he appears to have contained the 
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potential challenges outlined above, and particularly across several powerful bureaucracies nearly 
simultaneously, would seem to suggest that his detractors may have far less ability to engage in 
potentially destabilising “pushback” than often is suggested.
NEXT STEPS UNCLEAR, BUT UNINTENDED CONSEQUENCES  
MAY SPELL TROUBLE
Given the deep veil of secrecy that enshrouds China’s special services, it is di cult to determine 
what precise impact, if any, Xi’s attack on the security apparatus is having on its behaviour. What 
is abundantly clear is that Xi has used the purge to put his own trusted men in key positions. 
Perhaps the most notable is Fu Zhenghua, who, after being elevated from Beijing police chief to 
vice minister of public security in 2013, quickly has risen from that ministry’s ifth-ranking deputy 
slot to its irst. Fu seems to be Xi’s go-to man for sensitive investigations, having played a role in 
the Zhou Yongkang case as well as the investigation into allegations of market manipulation in 
conjunction with the August 2015 stock market meltdown. Another newly-minted vice minister of 
public security, Meng Qingfeng, served as Xi’s deputy police chief when the latter was party sec-
retary (2002-07) in Zhejiang Province. Fu Zhenghua also was succeeded as Beijing police chief by 
another Xi associate, Wang Xiaohong, who served with him during his nearly twenty year run as 
a provincial oicial in Fujian. In a parallel development in the MSS, rumoured Xi ally Chen Wenqing 
is now serving as the ministry’s party secretary and acts as its chief in all but name. A former 
police oicer and member of the CCP’s anti-graft watchdog, the Central Commission for Discipline 
Inspection (CCDI), Chen has a background in state security work as well, if a somewhat dated one. 
So, at least this aspect of Xi’s purge of the security services would seem to be little more than an 
efort to sweep out the old and bring in the new.
What remains obscured at this stage is whether there’s anything more than that when it 
comes to the crackdown. One issue of note is what Xi intends to do structurally with the security 
services. For example, while the precise functions of the national Security Commission (nSC) es-
tablished at the Third Plenum remain unclear, most experts agree that it has more of a domestic 
security focus than a foreign one. Was Xi’s interest in downgrading the oversight of the security 
services at the 18th Party Congress a prelude to the stand-up of the nSC? If so, what might that 
portend for future restructuring of the security apparatus? Is there a parallel between the way 
in which the corruption dragnet in the PLA has cleared the path for the most sweeping command 
structural reforms in that institution’s history and what might be in store for the security organs? 
We likely will have to wait until at least the 19th Party Congress to gain any sense of that.
Another suggestion of a broader agenda by Xi may have come from one of his earliest 
speeches as CCP general secretary. Touring Shenzhen in Guangdong only a month after taking 
power, Xi reportedly gave a non-public speech to party cadre where he railed against the fact 
that “nobody was man enough to stand up and resist” when the Soviet Union collapsed (Beach 
2013). In that same speech, Xi singled out the corruption and laxity in the Soviet Union’s security 
services, as well as the nationalisation of the Soviet military, which “left the party disarmed,” as 
critical enablers of the regime’s collapse. It is likely that Xi and his senior civilian colleagues may 
have had similar concerns when the Egyptian military stood idly by while President Hosni Mubarak 
was deposed without iring a shot in 2011. If another Tiananmen-like crisis emerged, would the 
PLA be ready to defend the party once more? One other possibility is that Xi’s purge of the secu-
rity services – and perhaps even the broader pervasive political tightening across the system – is 
meant to prepare the control apparatus for a particularly tumultuous period ahead, and not merely 
a retrograde turn toward greater authoritarianism as is so often suggested. While Xi is keeping his 
cards very close to the vest, and the regime’s recent behaviour certainly is not encouraging, it is 
still possible that the efort to purify the security services represents a “hardening” of the political 
system to manage the side efects of moving forward with the reforms hinted at during the Third 
Plenum.
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One deeply troubling aspect of the crackdown is that the security services, after nearly two 
years of relentless strife, may be unusually keen to demonstrate their loyalty and efectiveness 
to President Xi. The special services’ seeming comfort engaging in extraterritorial renditions – 
whether nabbing booksellers of Thai beaches and in neighbouring Hong Kong or through eforts 
to detain corrupt oicials abroad as part of the “Fox Hunt” and “Operations Skynet” – certainly 
seems a hallmark of the Xi era. What remains unclear, however, is whether President Xi personally 
sanctioned such actions or whether the security services were just eager to please. Likewise, 
the series of recent laws passed by the national People’s Congress, China’s legislature, granting 
sweeping powers to the security services on very broadly-deined national security issues may in 
part relect an efort by Xi to ofer the guardians of the regime a few carrots to go with the heavy 
stick. Still, overenthusiastic security organs amid a deepening downturn in China’s economy – and 
the resultant potential for substantial unrest – may prove a particularly volatile and worrisome 
cocktail going forward.
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THE OVERALL AIM OF JUDICIAL REFORM IS TO ACHIEVE EFFICIENT CONTROL  
OVER LOCAL GOVERNANCE
By the time Xi Jinping came to power, widespread corruption had eroded the legitimacy of the CCP. 
Petitions and protests by dissatisied citizens proliferated in the provinces. The Xi administration 
resolved to revitalise the general public’s trust of the CCP and its court system by enhancing the 
eiciency of local courts in hearing civil, administrative and criminal cases. Above all, Xi Jinping’s 
plan in initiating a new round of judicial reforms is to empower local judicial organs to help rein 
in rampant nepotism and corruption, diminish local obstacles to economic reforms, and mitigate 
social conlicts more efectively and convincingly. 
Xi’s new blueprint for judicial reforms is diferent to those of his predecessors in that it nei-
ther allows local Party committees to exert overwhelming control over the local court system 
(as under Jiang Zemin), nor imposes severe punishment on judges for making controversial court 
decisions that may have widespread social impacts (as under Hu Jintao). In particular, the CCP 
leadership aims to retool the fragmentary contours of the local judicial system and retrieve ei-
cient control over local governance. However, the success of the judicial reforms depends largely 
on the loyalty and endurance of local judicial functionaries. Any plan that fails to take this factor 
into account will exacerbate the problems in the current judicial system. This essay enunciates 
a trilogy of the goals, measures and risks of Xi’s judicial reforms and delivers an assessment of 
future prospects.
CURRENT STATUS: SECURING CONTROL OF LOCAL POLITICAL,  
ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL AFFAIRS
Restoring a credible court system by curtailing nepotism and corruption
Over the years, one of the most vociferously supported suggestions from Chinese legal schol-
ars and practitioners has been to make courts and procuratorates more independent from local 
governments so as to preclude interference and enhance working eiciency. Local governments 
used to be in charge of the budget plans of all the courts and procuratorates in their admin-
istrative districts. As a result, it was easy for local government oicials to meddle with trials 
taking place in those courts. This often created obstacles hindering local inhabitants hoping to 
ile meaningful lawsuits within the jurisdiction zone. Inevitably, thus, it was far more di cult for 
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courts located within a local government’s municipal district to hear trials related to that govern-
ment impartially and efectively.
Starting in 2015, the CCP leadership has transferred the power of local governments over 
the budget plans of judicial organs in their administrative districts uniformly to inancial de-
partments at the provincial level. Moreover, some pilot local courts (e.g. in Shanghai) have been 
established to hear trials across diferent jurisdictional zones. These measures mark a progres-
sive reform scheme that permits the convergence of budgetary control of all the judicial organs 
within a province only at the provincial government level (Figure 9). As the inancial nepotism 
between sub-provincial governments and judicial organs in their municipalities is cut of, the 
political clout of those local governments with local judicial organs dwindles.
As an experiment and harbinger, regional chambers of the Supreme People’s Court/SPC (cir-
cuit tribunals) were established in 2015 in south and north-eastern China to resolve inter-provin-
cial legal disputes. In 2015, the number of cases these new independent courts heard and tried 
in the jurisdictional districts comprised about one third of the total cases heard by the SPC (SPC 
2016). To ensure the independence of local courts from sub-provincial governments, even the 
Central Commission for Discipline Inspection (CCDI) of the CCP declares that neither the discipli-
nary committees of the CCP nor government oicials of higher ranks should meddle with local 
trials. These developments indicate substantial progress on the eforts to create a more detached 
role for judicial organs in local trials.
Ensuring economic competition and innovation-oriented structural reforms
The Xi administration is aware that the legitimacy of its rule hinges on eicient implementation 
of its economic reforms. In hope of gaining new momentum for ofsetting a further slowdown 
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of China’s economy, the Xi administration advocated more initiatives for creating high-tech en-
terprises to unleash the creativity of innovative minds and accelerate industrial upgrading. To 
support technology-centred enterprises that tend to coalesce around China’s developed districts, 
it is essential to provide commensurate legal protection for their core technical know-how and 
capacity. At the end of 2014, the Xi administration established three local intellectual property (IP) 
courts in Beijing, Shanghai and Guangzhou respectively. These courts have accomplished stun-
ning feats. For example, the total number of IP cases in Shanghai in 2015 (1,641) was double that 
of 2014 (Li Xiang 2016). Easier access to justice helps deter potential competitors from usurping 
the intellectual achievements of high-tech enterprises.
Local governments driven by protectionism pose obstacles to further economic reforms. 
In particular, administrative decisions made merely in favour of local enterprises will hamper fair 
competition. An administrative litigation allows citizens and enterprises to ile lawsuits against 
government departments for unreasonable or arbitrary decisions concerning economic entitle-
ments such as administrative licenses for construction projects. The 1989 Administrative Litiga-
tion Act did not provide any mechanisms to deal with disputes arising from local governments’ 
failure to grant administrative permission to license applications concerning the proprietorship 
of natural resources and coniscation of real property. These disputes manifest the conlict of 
economic interests between ordinary Chinese and the government. In 2015, the CCP leadership 
initiated reforms of the administrative litigation system. The revised Administrative Litigation Act 
encompasses those types of disputes over signiicant economic agendas and lowers the thresh-
old for launching administrative lawsuits. The soaring numbers of administrative cases iled since 
then (see Figure 10) indicates a clear change: local governments face more legal pressure for 
making reasonable decisions than in the past. 
Empowering local judicial organs to grapple with salient social problems
Apart from economic agendas, the Xi administration seeks to mitigate growing socio-politi-
cal conlicts at the root of the governance chain. In recent years, Chinese courts have been 
given the task of appeasing grievances and unrest caused by social injustice to individuals. In 
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particular, Chinese citizens have expressed grave concerns about regular scandals related to 
environmental protection and food safety. Towards the end of former party general secretary 
Hu Jintao’s reign, it was regarded as a top priority for judges to take socio-political impacts like 
rising numbers of petitions or even protests against their judgements into account. Inluential 
media highlighted public events, resulting in more frequent instances of trials that overturned 
initial decisions made by local courts. Consequently, there were often multitudes of “complain-
ing visits” (上访) in Beijing, which exerted great pressure on the central government. Many 
judges strived to handle lawsuits through mediation rather than by court decisions.
To alleviate the imminent social pressure emanating from those issues, the revised Envi-
ronment Protection Act (which entered into force in January 2015) empowers procuratorates to 
launch public interest lawsuits against predatory enterprises that endanger collective interests. 
Additionally, the revised Food Safety Act (enacted in April 2015) allows courts to impose pro-
hibitive punitive ines on irresponsible food manufacturers and operators. Since 2015, courts 
and procuratorates have also instituted reforms that make it easier for citizens to submit peti-
tions by letters and visits at local level. Local judges now share part of the responsibilities that 
used to fall on the central government: what could have become acrimonious petitions in front 
of government buildings have turned into neat stacks of legal iles in courts.
As a result, the number of petition visits to the SPC in Beijing fell by 12% in 2015 (SPC 
2016). In a similar vein, local governments are less encumbered with the task of disentangling 
complaints: the number of petitions and visits by complainants to the higher courts or procu-
ratorates in Hainan, Hubei and Qinghai fell by 14% –17% (Chen Fei 2016). A recent report even 
estimates that the number of illegal jails (黑监狱), which detain unpopular visitors and petition-
ers, has decreased (Weiquanwang 2016).
FUTURE PROSPECTS: REFORMS AT THE EXPENSE OF LOCAL JUDICIAL  
FUNCTIONARIES ARE UNSUSTAINABLE
The judicial reforms represent the eforts of the Xi administration to stabilise the rule of the 
CCP. Previously, the CCP harnessed courts and procuratorates to provide vacancies for incom-
petent political cadres and retired military oicers. The judicial reforms removing the self-image 
and self-identity of judicial functionaries as mere government oicials are based on the legacy 
of the previous reforms that aim to cultivate a more professional team of judges and procu-
rators. However, this logic contains some risky miscalculations that are ofsetting the positive 
outcome of Xi’s judicial reforms: while the judicial reforms impose onerous burdens on judicial 
functionaries, Xi’s governance model fails to ofer equal legal conditions, signiicant economic 
incentives, and nationwide acknowledgment of their professional ethos.
Amplifying the fundamental lack of judicial independence at the central level
The judicial reforms so far have turned the heat on local judicial and government functionaries. 
Whereas local judicial organs may be more independent from local governments than before, Xi 
and his colleagues are well aware that the monopolistic rule of the Party will soon disintegrate 
if they introduce an exhaustive process of liberalising China’s judicial system. The failure to 
adopt equally eicient measures for inoculating judicial organs against political control at the 
central level, however, remains a fundamental law that enervates the professional ethos of 
judges even at higher levels. Despite the iat against meddling with local justice, the central 
government continues to leverage arbitrary legal measures such as coerced confessions of 
guilt on China Central Television (CCTV). Besides, Xi’s eforts to combine anti-corruption cam-
paigns with judicial reforms can only be branded as selective, since the campaign has excluded 
important members of the coalition of princelings. Consequently, local judicial functionaries will 
be punished for rent-seeking practices, whereas the egocentric behaviour of the central Party 
leadership (e.g. Panama Papers) is not subject to legal prosecution. 
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Fewer economic incentives than under previous administrations
While judges are not supposed to work for immoral gains, the situation is diferent in a par-
ty-state where law is still not a tool for restricting power, but a tool for consolidating power. 
Since the beginning, the success of China’s judicial reforms has been largely dependent on dis-
torted economic incentives for judicial functionaries, such as taking bribes from involved parties 
before a court session. Under former administrations, corruption in the local judicial system was 
accepted acquiescently as a compensatory bonus for relinquishing judicial independence. For 
those judicial functionaries who started their careers in the earlier post-Deng era, being a judge 
or procurator allowed one to reap colossal moonlight income and accumulate wealth as a tacit 
condition of supporting the rule of the party-state. Under Xi’s draconian anti-corruption cam-
paigns, however, the risk of taking such compensatory bonuses has grown considerably. Judges 
and procurators in China will be confronted with the serious problem of receiving a “meagre” pay 
in practice without such anticipated proits from corruption. Take Beijing and Shanghai as an 
example: the average salaries of judges (150,000 CnY per year) are only about one third of the 
average salaries of lawyers (400,000 – 500,000 CnY per year) (Ye Zhusheng 2015).
Heavier workloads and more social pressure 
Judges around the country are overburdened with a radically increasing number of cases. The 
SPC simpliied the rules for local citizens iling lawsuits considerably in 2015. Before 2015, a 
plaintif would usually wait for a certain amount of time before the court decided whether or 
not to accept a case. Since the new rules came into efect, courts have been obliged to reg-
ister lawsuits immediately, as long as they satisfy existing legal conditions. Judges may face 
severe sanctions for not accepting the iles in such circumstances. Apart from a nationwide 
total increase of litigations of more than 20%, judges dealt with far more cases on average in 
2015: judges in Beijing heard an average of more than 100 cases (around 20% annual increase); 
judges in Zhejiang province handled a daunting average of 218 (2.2 times the national aver-
age); and in the new Beijing IP court, 18 judges attained an incredible average of 370 cases (Li 
Xiang 2016).
Today, the political stunt of putting judges at the forefront of coping with social crisis and 
daily petitions may even cost their lives. Despite their hard work and dedication, it is extremely 
di cult, if not impossible, for local judicial functionaries alone to win wide acknowledgement 
of their professional values. The proliferation of such clashes between China’s judicial system 
and the grassroots will further discourage prominent young jurists from keeping on their work 
as local judicial functionaries. In fact, there has been a spate of resignations among even expe-
rienced judicial functionaries. This trend will probably continue. As such, Xi’s judicial reforms will 
fail ultimately, if they do not seek to: 
  inoculate the central leadership against nepotism and corruption;
  provide suicient economic incentives to judicial personnel;
  protect judicial staf from work overload and social pressure.
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Part 3: Controversies and Scenarios
The last few years have seen dramatic changes in the Chinese political landscape that raise signif-
icant questions about where China is headed. The Chinese Communist Party (CCP) has revitalised 
Leninist party governance mechanisms and forcefully reasserted control over members of the 
government, military, media, economy, and society. Many observers attribute the Party’s dramatic 
resurgence to the face of this efort: General Secretary Xi Jinping. This assumption is the founda-
tion for several pieces of conventional wisdom, which present Xi himself as the primary driver of 
change in China and focus on his actions as the best way to analyse China’s future. 
This narrative may turn out to be the closest to the truth. However, given the opacity of the 
Chinese system, forcing us to frequently rely on information that is anecdotal or shaped by the 
PRC propaganda apparatus, this narrative may miss key elements of China’s political landscape. 
Indeed, if Xi is viewed as a creature of his Party and of his times, who assumed his mantle with a 
mandate for a particular vision of reform and a broad recognition that strong, revitalised central 
leadership was required to carry it out, alternative narratives may be crucial to understanding 
decision making within China have important implications for China and foreign observers. 
This paper will provide a larger context for Xi’s actions and posit that, even as major changes 
have occurred in China’s political landscape, available evidence does not rule out alternative narra-
tives. This paper is not meant to argue for an all-or-nothing interpretation of Xi Jinping’s personal 
power, or to deny that individual leaders can determine a nation’s trajectory in crucial ways. How-
ever, by reviewing the dominant narrative frameworks and discussing additional structural and 
situational factors driving Chinese policy, this paper aims to highlight what is missing from much 
of the conventional wisdom and present a preliminary alternative framework for thinking about 
the future of Chinese politics.
Xi Jinping: The man, the myth, the Party
Some western misunderstandings of Xi Jinping’s leadership
Jessica Batke
This article relects the personal views of the author and not necessarily the views 
of the U.S. Government or the Department of State.
KEY FINDINGS
  Xi Jinping is not the sole or even primary 
factor causing recent major shifts in the 
Chinese political landscape. Structural 
and situational factors also explain 
many of these changes.
  In fact, the policies Xi is pursuing are 
largely in line with the Party’s previ-
ously-articulated agenda. His apparent 
increase in decision-making power – 
though far from certain in all cases – is 
in part the result of collective sense of 
urgency at the highest levels prior to 
the leadership turnover. 
  Xi’s “cult of personality” is a far cry from 
the fervour of the cult of Mao. Media 
coverage of Xi Jinping should be viewed 
in the context of a highly professional 
and deliberate leadership personality 
management system that serves the 
CCP’s modern propaganda needs.
  When assessing the future trajectory of 
the Chinese political system, we would 
be well-served to focus on the success 
or failure of the CCP’s policy agenda and 
not just on the man heading it. Indeed, 
a spectacular failure could threaten the 
existence of the entire regime. 
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CONVENTIONAL WISDOM 1 – XI’S PERSONAL AGENDA HAS DEFINED CHINA’S 
POLICY STRATEGY
The Xi administration started in on its anti-corruption campaign almost immediately after the 
leadership turnover, sending shock waves throughout the governance system. Combined with 
a more tightly-controlled media and social sphere, the resulting alterations to Chinese political 
life are undeniable. Many observers point to Xi as the sole or primary driver of these alternations. 
However, Xi beneited from a collective sense of urgency about the challenges facing the Party 
and a mandate for reform to tackle these challenges.
Years before the most recent leadership transition, the CCP began to systematically analyse 
the pressures leading to the collapse of the USSR and identifying changes it would have to make 
to avoid the same fate. By late-2012, the pressures the CCP faced ranged from economic (the 
deiciencies of an export- and investment-intensive growth model had been exacerbated by the 
2008 stimulus in response to the global inancial crisis) to social (growing middle-class dissatis-
faction with quality-of-life issues such as pollution and food safety), to technological and ideo-
logical (the advent of social media amplifying non-Party messages, raising the spectre of popular 
revolt), and to institutional (the CCP’s internal rot threatening to undermine Party functioning and 
legitimacy). This inal issue was dramatically underscored by the 2012 public revelation of Chong-
qing Party Secretary Bo Xilai’s crimes – the most serious of which, if oicially unmentioned, was 
his attempt to circumvent leadership selection processes. The new leadership had little choice but 
to act quickly and aggressively in order to preserve CCP rule, giving Xi a mandate to tackle these 
challenges in a manner more decisive than his predecessors.
Xi likely personally shared this sense of crisis and urgency. Certainly, as part of the previous 
leadership cohort, he had a hand in shaping the current policy agenda aimed at these challenges. 
Anecdotal tales about Xi’s formative years or quotes from recent speeches suggest that he sin-
cerely believes in the Party’s historic mission to rejuvenate the nation. But whatever Xi’s beliefs, 
his policy behaviour since taking power remains consistent with the policy strategies outlined by 
the outgoing leadership. The 18th Party Congress work report, written under Hu’s leadership and 
built upon familiar policy themes from previous Congresses, articulated the Party’s consensus 
goals and policy preferences and presented Xi and his colleagues with a mandate for reform. 
This even includes the signature initiative of the Xi administration, the anti-corruption cam-
paign, which is the initiative that appears to diverge most strikingly from leadership precedent. 
Many observers initially interpreted the campaign as Xi Jinping’s attempt to consolidate power 
and eliminate personal or political enemies. Yet, the campaign itself has proven to be long-lasting, 
expansive in scope, and increasingly systematic in the sectors it investigates, afecting tens of 
thousands of oicials with no connection to Xi or his associates. When considered alongside other 
initiatives (such as the State Council’s “powers list,” which aims to clarify government agencies’ 
powers and prevent arbitrary fees and bribes), the Party’s anti-corruption eforts strongly suggest 
an organisation trying to clean out the worst of its corruption and remove obstructions to fur-
ther governance reform, in accordance with long-standing Party priorities. This does not preclude 
personal score-settling or beneits for Xi, but it is very di cult to explain the campaign as driven 
purely by elite politics. 
Thus, given that policy under Xi has not wildly deviated from previously-articulated Party 
strategies and objectives, the most straightforward assumption holds that the current leader-
ship’s policy priorities relect broader agreement how to address threats to Party rule. Xi himself 
likely shares these priorities, but available evidence does not prove they are solely his. This also 
does not rule out the existence of disagreements among top leaders, including personality-driven 
conlicts. But the contours of these conlicts remain largely hidden to us, and it is di cult to prove 









by the outgoing 
leadership. 
74 | MERICS | PAPERS On CHInA no 1 | June 2016
CONVENTIONAL WISDOM 2 – XI IS CONCENTRATING POWER TO HIS PERSON AND 
TO BE WIELDED IN DICTATORIAL FASHION
Many observers assert that Xi has drawn the reins of power tightly to himself through, among 
other eforts, the creation or expansion of high-level Party policy structures. Xi may indeed have 
more decision-making leeway than his predecessor. Yet, some of this concentration of authority is 
due to several key top-level structural changes initiated under the previous leadership to allow for 
more decisive action, suggesting a mandate for centralisation in service of the aforementioned 
Party priorities. Additionally, the creation of new structures, in and of itself, is not adequate as 
diagnostic evidence of Xi’s personal power.
At the very highest level, Xi beneits from structural changes enacted or approved by the 
previous leadership cohort. He heads a slimmed-down Politburo Standing Committee, likely de-
signed for quicker, more focused decision-making after the apparent policy stagnation during Hu 
Jintao’s second term. Xi gained further political space as Hu stepped down from all three top lead-
ership positions (in contrast to Hu’s predecessor Jiang Zemin, who retained his position as head 
of the Central Military Commission for two years after stepping down as General Secretary). Xi 
also inherited Central Committee staf, responsible chiely to him, which had been enlarged and 
empowered under Hu. (Heath 2015) 
The creation of new leading small groups (LSGs), several of which Xi heads, is often cited 
as evidence of Xi seizing power for himself. This claim rests on several assumptions, the irst of 
which is that heading a group deinitively confers additional power on the man already holding 
all top central leadership posts and disregards other bureaucratic players. LSGs, long an inluential 
part of the PRC policy-making process, deliberately include representatives from other relevant 
Party and state institutions, including other Politburo Standing Committee (PBSC) members. So 
does the creation of new LSGs represent an end-run around other policy-making institutions, 
even if those institutions are represented in the new LSGs? Do they equal a zero-sum expansion 
of Xi’s inluence, or can they bring additional expert voices into the policy discussion? If the new 
LSGs also contain relevant PBSC members, does Xi gain additional power from heading a policy 
discussion in an LSG venue rather than at the PBSC?
Further, what does it mean, on a day-to-day basis, to chair multiple LSGs in addition to run-
ning a nation of 1.4 billion? Given the other demands for his time, a signiicant portion of these 
groups’ work is likely handled by the groups’ other members and their supporting bureaucracies. 
Xi certainly personally inluences a group’s activities when he is directly involved – and, according 
to anecdotes, may be inclined to micromanage – but there must be a limit to how much micro-
managing one man can do. The new LSGs also have more deputy heads than previously-existing 
ones, which suggests the complexity of the tasks undertaken as well as the involvement, if not 
empowerment, of other leaders in the Party’s policy endeavours. Even if heading more groups 
does directly equate to more power, it remains unclear exactly how many groups Xi heads. (Wang 
Shu 2015) If he heads more leading small groups than Hu Jintao did, it is still a minority of more 
than 20 publicly-acknowledged LSGs. And while the Xi administration has been more transparent 
about current LSGs, we still don’t know much more about how they operated under Hu.
How much of the recent structural changes are due to the CCP’s reform plans and how much 
of it is due to Xi’s personal quest for power? Both structural and personal factors are likely in 
play here, but at least some centralisation was initiated before Xi took the helm as a prerequisite 
for the implementation of long-standing Party priorities. It is also unclear how much some more 
recent structural changes are afecting personal power concentration. 
CONVENTIONAL WISDOM 3 – XI IS BUILDING A CULT OF PERSONALITY 
Chinese media coverage of Xi Jinping shows a bolder, more charismatic leader than did coverage 
of Hu Jintao. Observers commonly cite this apparently more personalised media treatment as evi-
dence of Xi Jinping’s desire to build a cult of personality. 
Yet, the change in coverage also aligns with several CCP goals. First among these is to re- 
establish the faded CCP brand and reinvigorate positive popular sentiment toward the Party. (Ci 
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Jiwei 2014) Modifying leadership media treatment to focus more on the top leader supports this 
efort, inasmuch as it gives the Party a centre of gravity in the form of a strong, trustworthy, per-
sonally-relatable leader. This rebranding efort is also evident in the push for “new oicial-speak” 
(initiated in the last years of the Hu administration) and in the frequent release of cartoons and 
songs that aim to reach a younger audience on digital platforms. From this perspective, the CCP’s 
glossier treatment of Xi Jinping looks very much like a Leninist propaganda system trying to drag 
itself into the modern media and social environment. Other changes may be the result of person-
ality, but not necessarily indicative of a personality cult. Certainly in comparison to his “wooden” 
predecessor, the CCP’s propaganda apparatus has more raw material to work with in General Sec-
retary Xi Jinping. 
It is notable that, since taking up China’s top leadership spot, Xi Jinping is not known for go-
ing of-script in his public appearances, as Jiang Zemin sometimes memorably did. The near-total 
adherence to a script raises questions about how much of his public persona is attributable to him 
and how much is created in concert with his propaganda team. Of course, none of this excludes 
the possibility that Xi Jinping is seeking personal adulation. Yet it bears remembering that the Par-
ty’s propaganda mechanisms are responding to changes other than just Xi’s relative power within 
the leadership structure. Indeed, media coverage of Xi Jinping should be viewed in the context 
of a highly professional and deliberate leadership personality management system, reducing our 
ability to infer too much about the man based on his media image. 
A CREATURE OF AN EMBATTLED SYSTEM
Analysis of Xi Jinping’s personal power is most signiicant not as an end in itself, but rather as a 
way for us to gauge where the Chinese political system is headed. And the Chinese political sys-
tem, as embodied by the CCP and Xi Jinping, is currently ighting for its own survival. Xi inherited 
the Party’s prescribed course of action for this struggle: a combination of economic and govern-
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ance reforms that ensure adequate public service provision and transition the economy to a new 
growth model, alongside political initiatives that enhance Party discipline and stile extra-Party 
voices. Whether or not this strategy will work depends partly on the Xi administration’s ability to 
execute it, but more so whether the strategy itself is inherently suicient to save the regime. 
In our quest to understand the future of the Chinese political system, then, we would be 
well-served to focus on the viability this strategy and not only on the man currently heading it. 
If the CCP has judged correctly, the public will remain acceptably quiescent, the Party tolerably 
coherent as an organisation, and the economy strong enough to keep chugging along. In this 
case, the Party may well deem the current mode of leadership a success and seek to replicate it. 
Alternatively, the strategy itself might prove to be the wrong solution to the Party’s problems, or 
get executed so poorly that it does not function as intended. Likewise, the CCP might have mis-
calculated its ability to impose its vision on lower-level cadres, many of whom resent its efects 
on their interests. Xi, as the face of the agenda, would be a likely target of public ire – though in 
such a situation, a leadership reshule would be the least of Party concerns. Indeed, a spectacular 
failure could threaten the existence of the entire regime. 
Of course, Xi could upend this calculus by overstepping his mandate. Were we to begin to see 
a series of policy directives that contravene the general policy line, we could infer that they were 
the result of an individual’s personal whim or the makings of a very high-level opposition group 
within the Party. That would be a dangerous moment for Party unity and survival, and could also 
portend momentous change for Chinese politics, if not the state.
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ACHIEVING ECONOMIC SUCCESS MORE COMPLICATED  
THAN ASSERTING PARTY CONTROL 
What if Xi Jinping succeeds in strengthening party control and re-balancing the economy? The 
deinition of “success” is of course open to interpretation. Equally, so is the question of whether 
successful economic management is compatible with a strengthened party. I will try to address 
these potential contradictions in the course of the paper.
My view is that the second part of the equation – rebalancing the economy, while main-
taining steady growth – is more important than the irst in the short run, and also more di cult. 
Further, I would argue that the former ultimately depends on the latter, rather than the other 
way around. To put it another way, the best measure of Xi’s success will be his stewardship of 
the economy, because it makes everything else easier to manage, be it social stability, foreign 
policy, funding desperately needed government programmes, on the environment and pensions, 
to name two, and party reform. 
Some commentators have argued that Xi has subordinated economic reform to party con-
solidation. Equally, the argument in favour of party reform and a cleaner CCP is that it lays down 
the tracks for substantive and credible economic reform. Xi is “turning left to turn right”, in the 
same way some have suggested he is doing with an anti-graft campaign that will morph into 
legal reform. But it is not clear to me that party consolidation bodes well for economic reform, 
whatever the sequencing may be. In fact, if we agree that liberalisation in some form is what 
China’s economy needs, party consolidation instinctively pushes the leadership in a more con-
servative direction. 
What if Xi Jinping succeeds in restructuring the economy 
and strengthening the CCP?
Richard McGregor
KEY FINDINGS
  Rebalancing the economy, while 
maintaining steady growth – is more 
important than strengthening the  
party in the short run, and also more 
di cult.
  Xi has the ability to make decisions  
and force them through the bureaucratic 
and party apparatus, but he lacks any 
feel for a vast, complicated and glob-
ally-integrated economy. There are no 
easy victories in economic policy, nor 
guaranteed outcomes.
  The rebalancing of the Chinese  
economy is well under way but is not 
guaranteed. Breaking China’s own iron 
triangle, of the CCP, state owned  
companies and provincial, city and local 
governments is the most crucial  
element in unleashing the growth  
potential of the Chinese economy.
  It would mark an epochal event, if the 
economy manages a transition away 
from traditional heavy industries. An 
economy which still allows a substantial 
role for the state would have enhanced 
credibility elsewhere in the world as an 
alternative to the U.S.
  If Xi Jinping succeeds, the core mission 
of the CCP, to recapture China’s  
vaulted place amongst nations, would 
be invigorated the more it had the 
means to do so. There is nothing in the 
party’s DnA, nor in the public’s that 
suggests China would be more accom-
modating if it were more powerful and 
better armed.
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The CCP party secretary possesses enormous power, especially when he, or she, grabs its 
levers with alacrity and uses them, as Xi has. Personnel changes in the military, an enhanced role 
for the anti-graft body, a reduced role for the premier and the state council – all look from the out-
side to be tough, di cult and indeed daring decisions, which from a purely political perspective, 
they are. But whereas Xi has the ability to make such decisions and force them through in the 
short-term, he cannot snap his ingers in the same fashion with a vast, complicated and global-
ly-integrated economy. An economy does not respond to overnight or even incremental change 
in the way that a political party might, nor do the interest groups that make up its parts. In short, 
there are no easy victories in economic policy, nor guaranteed outcomes.
MAKING STRUCTURAL REFORMS A SUCCESS REQUIRES MORE THAN AN 
AUTOCRATIC LEADERSHIP STYLE
On top of that is Xi’s own autocratic leadership style, according to which he has marginalised 
the State Council and centralised policy and decision making in his personal oice. This does 
not necessarily dictate bad outcomes. Although this strays into the realm of speculation, there 
are a number of possible reasons for Xi’s administrative set-up. He has a sense of urgency on a 
number of fronts. On foreign policy, he sees a strategic opportunity in Asia, which he wants to 
exploit with a cautious president in the White House, and thus needs to move quickly. Secondly, 
he thinks the consensus, irst-amongst-equals-style leadership of Hu and Wen was inefective 
and easily parried by powerful interest groups which blossomed under their weak stewardship 
of the party and the economy. While Hu and Wen frequently diagnosed the economy’s problems 
with great perspicuity, they were not deft in addressing them.
Chinese leaders who have got things done in the past, in good and bad ways – see Deng 
Xiaoping and Mao Zedong respectively – have been autocratic. So, too, was Zhu Rongji. Xi may be 
taking his stylistic cues from them – the conviction that only an autocrat can cut through multiple 
levels of party and government bureaucracies, and entrenched, networked corruption embedded 
within them, to force change. Finally, there is Xi’s sense of manifest destiny, of a genuine prince-
ling who is convinced he knows what’s best for his party and his country.
Furthermore, while Xi is steeped in the CCP, in everything from its origins to its internal pro-
cedures, he has given no impression that he has any feel for a modern economy, even after years 
as serving as party secretary in Fujian, Zhejiang and Shanghai, all areas which have some of the 
most vibrant private and public sector businesses.
The counterpoint to this assertion is the inluence of his father, who was a strong supporter 
of Deng Xiaoping, and spent his inal years living in Shenzhen. In other words, Xi hails from the 
market reform wing of the CCP. Secondly, he also presided over Fujian and Zhejiang without in-
terfering with their wealth-creation models. (He was posted in Shanghai far too briely to make 
substantial changes in the way the city was run.)
Finally, Xi must ind a way to surmount a looming debt crisis. It is the economy’s Achilles 
heel, a bubble that will burst unless it can be artfully delated. Although the bursting of the bub-
ble in various forms has been often predicted, the remarks of one of those sages, George Soros, 
at an Asia Society event in April 2016 in new York is nonetheless germane – that such bubbles 
can last a lot longer than many expected, and indeed take on a “parabolic” form towards their de-
nouement, when most of the damage occurs. Economist George Magnus estimates that China’s 
debt to GDP ratio will exceed 300 per cent by the turn of the decade. On this scenario, the best 
China can hope for is a Japan-style muddle through, but at signiicantly lower levels of wealth per 
capita than Japan, with larger gaps in incomes between the haves and have-nots, and in a vastly 
more degraded physical environment and unstable polity.
China’s stock market is neither a store of wealth, nor a barometer for the economy’s broader 
health, as it was in Japan in 1990, when its bubble started to delate. But in other respects, the 
outlook for the two economies – Japan at the start of the 90s and China today – have much in 
common. In both countries, deep problems were hidden under the surface, as economist Arthur 
Kroeber has pointed out. Corporate Japan got caught in a debt trap – as companies deleveraged, 
Richard McGregor 
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the government had to increase its own spending and borrowing to fend of economic collapse. 
In the meantime, the government failed to execute the kinds of market-oriented reforms that 
could have boosted growth.
China is still fundamentally an economy with lots of growth potential but the Beijing 
government’s instincts are similar to those of the reigning Japanese bureaucrats at the time 
– to intervene to prop up property prices in China’s case, and put off reforms which would 
be disruptive to China’s own iron triangle, of the CCP, state owned companies and provincial, 
city and local governments. If that is the case, then the economy’s growth potential will be 
diminished.
Aside from the state of the global economy, which has an impact on China, Xi faces other 
di cult barriers to maintaining healthy growth. By 2020, near the end of Xi’s second term (pre-
suming he has one), China will be near its demographic tipping point. The demographic crunch 
will mean a narrowing of the tax base at a time of rising pension costs, and lower output with-
out substantial productivity gains. The share of the population of the elderly will start to rise 
rapidly. China currently has more than 185 million citizens over the age of 60. The elderly now 
account for around 12% of China’s population, a igure that is predicted to swell to 34% by 2050.
China’s working age population has already started to shrink but at the turn of the decade, 
it will start to contract rapidly, with concrete impacts to the labour market, consumption and 
pensions. The demographic dividend from the supply of young, cheap workers into the manufac-
turing sector has all but gone. Without large structural reform by then, the sorts of issues that Xi 
is grappling with now will be more intractable.
There are signs that China’s economic transition is already happening. nonetheless, China’s 
old economy based on manufacturing and construction, is weak, so much so that the government 
has delivered a modest credit stimulus this year to prop it up. In 2015, consumption and services 
outpaced the old drivers of growth, of manufacturing and investment, for the fourth successive 
year. For all of Donald Trump’s protestations about the inlux of Chinese goods into the U.S. and 
other markets, net exports have not contributed to China’s GDP since 2007- 08. In short, the 
rebalancing that China has talked about for more than a decade is well underway.
Although deinitions of economic “success” are open to debate, they should not be bench-
marked by headline GDP growth rates. Restructuring and rebalancing, along with demographic 
changes and what one analyst calls the “law of large numbers” (two decades of ten per cent 
growth) means that nearly every aspect of the economy will slow in coming years. By itself, 
though, slowing headline numbers give a misleading impression. For starters, the economy is 
growing of a far higher base. This year’s “slow” pace of growth of 6.9 per cent is of a base which 
is 300 per cent larger than it was a decade ago, when growth was about ten per cent. Six per 
cent growth in consumption and services can easily produce more jobs than double that rate of 
growth based on heavy industry.
HARD-WON ECONOMIC SUCCESS IS UNLIKELY TO MAKE CHINA  
A MORE ACCOMMODATING INTERNATIONAL ACTOR
Having said so much about the chances of failure, success against these odds would be a tri-
umph, and deliver a massive windfall for the CCP and Xi personally.
First, there is what we might call the psychic upside of success, on top of the obvious po-
litical beneits. Within China and outside of it, Xi’s ability to preside over a restructuring of the 
economy at sustainable levels of growth ofers huge propaganda beneits in the best sense of 
the word.
Chinese success would be in contrast with the west’s secular stagnation, a contrast that 
might be more enduring than the short, sharp burst of hubris that China enjoyed after the inan-
cial crisis of 2008–09. Although I don’t think we can divide the world into two diferent systems, 
along the binary lines of a market-driven “Washington Consensus” against a state-anchored 
”Beijing Consensus”, Chinese economic success would have an enormous demonstration efect 
nonetheless. The world might not be able to be divided into two distinct economic systems, but 
it would be divided into two power centres, one rising at the other’s expense.
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The psychic upside is obvious. After years of predictions – some soundly argued, others 
much less so – that a CCP-led economic system would either collapse or at best drift into a kind of 
sour stagnation, the successful navigation into a new economy would deliver the kind of coni-
dence boost that has been lacking in China in the last few years. Indeed, for a state-led economy 
to make the transition away from traditional heavy industries, like steel and construction, which 
are reliant on physical rather than intellectual input, would be an epochal event. Far from having 
feet of clay, an economy which still allows a substantial role for the state would have enhanced 
credibility elsewhere in the world as an example to be followed. 
Would a successful, richer, more self-conident China be less prickly with foreigners and 
more amenable to compromise in its territorial claims? I think the opposite is more likely. The core 
mission of the CCP, to recapture China’s vaulted place amongst nations, would be invigorated the 
more it had the means to do so. There is nothing in the party’s DnA, nor in the public’s, as far as 
one can tell, that suggests China would be more accommodating if it were more powerful and 
better armed.
Here, we should consider what “success” means in foreign and security policy. I would argue 
that this has changed under Xi, perhaps inevitably given the country’s growing economic and 
military power. It is striking to compare the mainstream view of how China should rise as a “great 
power”, as articulated by the 12-part CCTV series on the history of great powers broadcast in 
2006, and written over the previous three years, with the ambition on the display today.
The CCTV series praised the values of many western democracies and their contribution to 
diferent countries’ accumulation of power and empire. Although the series did not urge China to 
emulate democracies, it did warn against conlict of any kind with foreign powers, lest the coun-
try’s development be thrown of course. In this respect, such cool-headed, open-minded views 
which were mainstream in the early years of the 21st century mirror the unfashionable and much 
reviled opinions recently expressed by Wu Jianmin, the retired diplomat, in support of the beneits 
that China’s interactions with the west have brought it. By contrast, Xi seems to be executing 
the alternative, and increasingly dominant, view – that a stronger China should forcefully take its 
due – in places like the South China Sea. 
If Chinese conidence, and indeed righteousness, are ampliied by economic success, then it 
is also true that its ambitions would be better funded. China would have more money to spend on 
its military which in turn would be better equipped in its quest to extend its reach ofshore, in par-
ticular in the region, around Japan, Taiwan and to the south. China’s south-east Asian neighbours, 
whose current strategy seems to be make the South China Sea a multilateral issue, rather than 
one negotiated country-by-country with China, might reconsider their options. This will especially 
be the case if they can see over the horizon with greater certitude that China’s military capabili-
ties are catching up and could soon surpass those of a retreating or even static U.S.
A healthy economy will also underwrite Xi’s risky, once-in-a-generation restructuring of its 
military, which aims to shift power to the country’s naval, air and missile forces, to bolster regional 
territorial claims and China’s growing economic interest around the world. Beyond the strategic 
thrust of this reform is the social problem of absorbing into the job market the 300,000 troops 
who are being cut from the force. They will join a pool of about six million existing veterans who 
have already protested publicly in recent years about a lack of government support. 
The same goes for the funding of many other areas that Beijing believes are essential to 
bolster comprehensive national strength and the maintenance of party control – education, basic 
research and internal security, to name a few. This is self-evident, but important nonetheless.
STRENGTHENING THE CCP –  
OPENING-UP WHILE KEEPING CONTROL OVER THE “THREE Ps” 
A successful economy, I would argue, is more easily deined than a strengthened party. Or, to put 
it another way, how does a strengthened party exist alongside of, and work in tandem with, a 
healthier economy, which in one form or another is likely to have less (although still signiicant) 
state control. Are the two compatible? Does success on economic policy imply failure in party 
consolidation, at least on terms by which Xi Jinping would deine it? 
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Economic liberalisation implies a deleveraging to some degree the Leninist state, be it in re-
ducing the direct power over personnel, and thus policy, at say the state banks, thereby reducing 
party/state control over lending. It may mean revamping the membership of the central commit-
tee, removing the ex oicio membership of large state enterprises, or diluting their political power 
by opening up more membership spots to entrepreneurs, which is surely a more preferable way to 
go. It may mean more non-party ministers in the State Council, rather than the relatively tokenis-
tic appointments in the recent past. It may mean greater experimentation in legal reform, to give 
the judiciary more genuine independence in deciding commercial cases, perhaps like Singapore.
In other words, keeping the core of the party/state, with control over the “three Ps” – the 
PLA, personnel and propaganda – while at the same time making the CCP a bigger tent overall. 
Success, then, could be measured as a more diverse economy and a more open party.
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FIVE SYSTEMIC PROBLEMS OF CCP RULE
Succession – Uncertain hierarchy leads to inighting 
First, there is the issue of succession. For some years now, it has become the conventional wis-
dom that China has solved the problem of succession. That was and is not true. Deng Xiaoping 
named Jiang Zemin to follow him and Hu Jintao to follow Jiang. But only Jiang Zemin consolidated 
power; Hu Jintao could only be the number two leader (二把手). Xi Jinping is the irst leader of 
the PRC who is not a irst generation revolutionary or named by one. So the party hierarchy is 
less clear than in the past and accordingly the inighting appears to have been considerably 
greater than in the past. It is genuinely extraordinary that Bo Xilai decided to challenge the 
decisions made at the 17th Party Congress and apparently conspired with Zhou Yongkang and 
others. As Xi Jinping put it, “In recent years, we have investigated high-level cadres’ serious vio-
lation of discipline and law, especially the cases of Zhou Yongkang, Bo Xilai, Xu Caihou, Ling Jihua 
and Su Rong. Their violation of the party’s political discipline and political rules was very serious; 
it had to be viewed seriously. These people, the greater their power and the more important 
their position, the more they ignored the party’s political discipline and political rules, even to 
the extent of being completely unscrupulous and reckless (肆无忌惮， 胆大包天)! Some had 
inlated political ambitions, and violated the party’s organisation to engage in political conspir-
acies (阴谋), to immorally (勾当) violate and split the party!” (CCDI and CCP DRO 2016: 28). It is 
di cult to level more serious charges. So it is very clear that the problem of succession has not 
been solved. 
Corruption – Campaigns don’t address root causes
Second, there is the problem of rampant corruption. The problem of corruption has been serious 
for many years, but it seems to have exploded in recent years, perhaps because of the massive 
inancial stimulus injected into the economy in 2008. Whatever the reason, the case of Bo Xilai, 
which was publicly presented as a corruption problem, highlighted this issue. This case made 
it apparent that corruption was widespread, of very large scale, and infected the party, even 
(especially?) at the highest levels. In response, Xi has carried out a massive campaign against 
corruption, one that is unprecedented in the reform era. To date, some 174 “tigers” (deined as 
vice-ministerial level and above) have been caught and over 750,000 “lies” have been charged. 
The ubiquity of corruption was nicely captured by the comment of one charged cadre, who said, 
What if Xi Jinping fails and Party control collapses?
Joseph Fewsmith
KEY FINDINGS
  Systemic risks to political stability and 
CCP rule persist despite China’s strong 
international position and inluence. 
These include: uncertainty over leader-
ship succession, pervasive corruption, 
factional competition, a lack of party 
discipline, and questions of CCP legiti-
macy.
  CCP rule may be resilient enough to deal 
with one of these issues at any given 
time, but a convergence of related crises 
could cause a collapse of the political 
system. 
  In case of CCP collapse, democratisation 
is an unlikely outcome. Rather, China 
would seem to be ripe for the establish-
ment of an authoritarian system given 
its weak civil society and legal system.
  As the gap between citizen expecta-
tions and the CCP governance style 
widens, so do the potential consequenc-
es of CCP failure. 
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“To be a section chief without spending money – show me. If somebody really has that ability, I’ll 
call him my daddy” (不花钱当个小科长叫我看看，真有那本事，我喊他大爷). 
The question going forward is whether any mechanism can be put in place to staunch cor-
ruption in the future. The PRC press has yet to specify the causes of such widespread corruption, 
and it seems di cult to address the issue systematically unless one lays out the causes. To date, 
we have seen new regulations governing the behaviour of cadres, tighter accounting systems, 
and a greater role for the Discipline Inspection Commissions at various levels, but it is not clear 
that such measures can address the systemic reasons that gave rise to corruption in the irst 
place.
Factions – Personal allegiances breed corruption and diminish discipline
Third, closely related to the issue of corruption is the problem of factions. China’s cadre system 
is the legacy of the Leninist system built over the course of the revolution. In the Maoist era, the 
way to keep cadres in line was to unleash political campaigns in which they could be subjected to 
criticism. China has moved a long way from the mass campaigns of the Mao era; indeed, the ab-
sence of such campaigns appears to have made cadres feel secure enough in their positions that 
they feel free to indulge in collusive behaviour for the economic and political beneit of the group. 
That is not to say that cadres do not feel pressure; on the contrary, the party bureaucracy is 
built on a mobilisational system that continues to charge lower-level cadres with “tasks” to per-
form (such as economic development). The pressures of such a system inevitably breed factions 
as cadres try to reduce uncertainty in their careers. Just how important such human links built 
on the trellis of the cadre system are, was brought out clearly in the exposure of corruption in 
Shanxi province (the native province of Ling Jihua). It became clear that individuals based their 
promotions on deep personal links with superiors (sweetened with gifts of cash), just as they 
promoted loyal underlings in a chain of corruption and power that reached from speciic localities 
to the provincial party standing committee (and, in the case of Shanxi, all the way into the halls of 
Zhongnanhai where they connected with Ling Jihua, head of the General Oice).
The question for the future is: Can any system without a Weberian-style bureaucracy sus-
tain economic growth over the long term? To date, China has done a remarkably good job of doing 
so, but the Leninist system has also generated the corruption and factionalism that has been so 
dysfunctional. It has also undermined the party discipline that is central to the system.
Lack of party discipline – Personal enrichment outweighs CCP goals
Fourth, as just suggested, the other side of the coin of factionalism is the lack of party discipline. 
Perhaps more than corruption, this is the issue that most vexes Xi Jinping. In his recently published 
book on party discipline, Xi states bluntly, “Our biggest challenge at present is that the party’s 
leadership has weakened and discipline is lax” (Ibid., p. 9). In his criticism of Bo Xilai and others, 
Xi says, “Some leading cadres put themselves above the party’s organisation; they think they 
are number one under heaven. Whenever the party sends them someplace to govern they make 
themselves into an ‘independent kingdom.’ When they use people or make decisions they don’t 
report to the centre as required by the regulations.” 
Xi’s campaign against corruption is also very much about restoring discipline to the party. 
But can a Leninist party, however disciplined it may be (or, perhaps, especially if it is disciplined) 
maintain political control over an increasingly pluralistic and marketised economy? This seems to 
be a direct contradiction, and Xi seems to be bucking the tides of history.
Questions of legitimacy – The CCP seeks a raison d’etre that is not revolution
Finally, the big problem that Xi and China (and therefore the world) face is that of legitimacy. In-
deed, China is the only great power that worries about its legitimacy on a daily basis. How do we 
know that the CCP worries about legitimacy? Because it tells us so.
The collapse of the former Soviet Union seems to haunt Xi and those around him. As soon 
as he became general secretary of the party, Xi went to Guangdong where he gave an internal 
speech in which he asked, “Why did the Soviet Union disintegrate? Why did the Soviet Communist 
Party collapse? An important reason was that their ideals and convictions wavered. Finally, all 
it took was one quiet word from Gorbachev to declare the dissolution of the Soviet Communist 
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Party, and a great party was gone.” “In the end nobody was a real man, nobody came out to resist.”
Similarly, Li Zhanshu, head of the General Oice and an apparent member of Xi’s inner circle, 
wrote that so-called “reform” in the Soviet Union had led to the “burying of the socialist enter-
prise.” Li concluded that, “The lesson is extremely deep.”
An important commentary likewise said in People’s Daily that, “Today, the Soviet Union, with 
its history of 74 years, has been gone for 22 years. For more than two decades, China has never 
stopped relecting on how the communist party and nation were lost by the Soviet Communists.” 
(Ren Zhongping 2013)
Such expressions of concern for the lack of legitimacy of the CCP and therefore its fragility 
can be multiplied. In response to legitimacy concerns, Xi rolled out his campaign about the “two 
thirty years.” His point was that one should not use the Maoist era to “negate” the reforms of the 
Deng era and beyond, just as one should not use the reforms of the past thirty years to negate 
to Maoist era. But the fact of the matter is that these two eras sit uneasily with each other. As 
the economy develops and personal freedoms expand, the Maoist era increasingly seems like an 
unnecessary and highly disruptive period that only delayed the modernisation of China. But if 
the revolution fades as a legitimating device, how can the CCP justify its continued rule? That is 
why “Document no. 9” – the infamous document that called on people not to discuss seven top-
ics – said that people should not engage in “historical nihilism.” Historical nihilism means writing 
careful history about how the CCP rose to power and the early years of the PRC. And a new crop 
of historians is doing precisely that.
MANY PATHS TO FAILURE, WITH POTENTIALLY PROFOUND CONSEQUENCES 
Given this array of problems, the odds of Xi failing, in one sense or another of that word, are fairly 
high. Xi could fail in a number of ways. First, his campaigns to ight corruption, increase party 
discipline, and centralise power could be blunted either by opposition or simply by the enormity 
of the tasks. That type of failure would likely lead to policy drift, not fatal in the short run, but 
perhaps debilitating over the long run. Second, it is possible, given the number of enemies Xi has 
seemingly created, that Xi might be removed by his colleagues. In recent years it has become 
common to speak of the Central Committee as a “selectorate,” and, presumably, the selectorate 
has the power to “de-select” as well as select. But the CCP has not removed a party leader since 
the revolutionary days, and only then through elaborate manoeuvres. A meeting of the Central 
Committee to remove Xi, à la Khrushchev, seems unlikely. And if it were to happen, the fall out in 
terms of leadership inighting would be enormous – which is one reason it is not likely to happen. 
That leaves the most extreme possibility, namely that the system would collapse, Xi taking the 
CCP down with him.
Although it seems unlikely at the moment, one might ask if some combination of succession 
politics, corruption, and internal discord in the CCP, perhaps converging with economic crisis and/
or public discontent could bring about the collapse of CCP rule? Should Xi fail in such a dramatic 
fashion, the consequences would be enormous. A dramatic failing would, of course, delegitimise 
the revolution and the CCP as a whole, spreading the consequences throughout the country and 
making it di cult to reconstitute the political order. 
What would be the result of such a dramatic collapse? One can think of two quite opposite 
possibilities. One is that the decentralising tendencies evident in local factionalism might metas-
tasise, making the restoration of political cohesion di cult. The other is that the military and/or 
security forces might well retain organisational coherence and become the focal point around 
which political forces might rally. Of course, both could happen in succession, rather like the rel-
ative chaos that occurred in the wake of the collapse of the CPSU, followed by the emergence 
of a strong man, à la Vladimir Putin. We live in a world in which authoritarian rule seems to be 
spreading, and China, given its weak civil society and legal system would seem to be ripe for such 
an authoritarian system, whether elected or not.
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THE COSTS OF FAILURE CONTINUE TO INCREASE
The topic “What if Xi Jinping fails and Party control collapses?”, focuses on what I hope is an ex-
treme possibility, but it does highlight some important issues. A decade ago, one could speak of 
modest political reform being experimented with. A gradual deepening of such reforms might have 
opened up the possibility of a healthier civil society and even “peaceful evolution.” At the same 
time, Hu Jintao’s calls for building a “harmonious society” suggested an efort to reconcile China’s 
Confucian heritage with a revolution initially built on “striking down Confucius’ shop.” We now 
seem far from those eforts and the possibilities they seemed to open up. Today, it seems more 
di cult to square eforts to tighten party discipline with the needs and desires of a burgeoning 
middle class and more di cult to align eforts to strengthen ideological appeals with traditional 
cultural values. If these gaps now seem wider, it suggests that the costs of failure have gone up.
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A common theme runs through this essay collection: the determined change of course that Xi 
Jinping has initiated, attempting to deine China’s political path into the twenty-irst century with 
the Chinese Communist Party irmly at the helm. The catalyst for Xi Jinping’s determination to 
adjust the trajectory of China’s political system was the state of erosion the CCP found itself in 
at the beginning of Xi’s tenure in 2012. The party had experienced a progressive deterioration of 
its organisational hold and internal discipline. Decision-making authority had been difused and 
largely delegated to lower levels of power. The formal command structures of the CCP had been 
undermined by informal modes of exchange resulting in endemic corruption. Political institutions 
had proved incapable of addressing the challenges brought about by the fast developments in 
China’s economy and society, the disruptive changes in the technological sphere, and rapid shifts 
in the global context. The CCP was, in the eyes of Xi Jinping, in an unit state to lead China into 
the future. 
From the start, Xi Jinping’s rule has been aimed at correcting this situation. China’s core ex-
ecutive has shown an extraordinary determination in combating the erosion of the CCP’s internal 
organisation and ighting vehemently against any attempt to undermine the party’s leadership. 
By launching an extensive anti-corruption and discipline campaign and by reinforcing the Leninist 
hierarchies and ideological tenets of the party-state, Xi Jinping made unmistakably clear that the 
CCP would steer China into the future.
COMMUNIST PARTY RULE: FACTORS OF STABILITY, SOURCES OF FRAGILITY
The scenarios for China’s political development presented in this essay are based on the funda-
mental strengths and weaknesses of the CCP’s rule, extrapolating their current trajectory into the 
future. Xi Jinping’s rule relies on a number of factors that provided stability to the CCP leadership 
in the past. Most importantly, CCP rule still rests on the considerable improvement in material 
living standards for large sections of the overall population and for the political elite since 1979, 
bolstering loyalty to the current regime from a large part of the new economic elite and the new 
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future, four scenarios for political devel-
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  ·  A centralised and disciplined party 
and security state (the “Xi system”).
  ·  A decentralised, institutionally  
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(the “Deng system”).
  ·  “Strong man” politics supported by 
the security organs and nationalism 
(the “Putin system”).
  ·  Chaotic pluralisation, a façade of 
democratic institutions, and informal 
oligarchies (the “Yeltsin system”).
  A version of the “Xi system”, possibly 
moderated by some aspects of the 
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social upper and middle classes. These improvements are complemented by state functions that 
are accepted by most citizens as essential beneits, particularly the state’s provision of material 
and non-material goods from healthcare to security and national pride, and to careers in the civil 
service or employment in state-owned enterprises.
A hallmark of CCP strength is the uncompromising defence of the party’s monopoly on power 
through an extensive and proliferating surveillance and police system. China’s state institutions 
still have a veritable arsenal of despotic instruments of power at their disposal, ranging from a 
comprehensive network of informants and varying forms of informal detention to arbitrary use of 
violence and highly sophisticated electronic surveillance systems to monitor people’s activities. 
A challenge to the Chinese party-state, one that the core executive is trying to turn into a 
strength, is the communicative-discursive component of power in today’s digital society. Despite 
the country’s tight rein on what citizens can access on the internet, interactive digital media is a 
potentially disruptive libertarian force that can challenge state institutions and inluence public 
opinion. However, the government has taken active steps to control the modern media and to 
exploit the internet to present its own agenda. These strategies expand on the traditional CCP 
approaches to “create a favourable public opinion” for the goals and actions of the party – only this 
time with the help of digital media.
One of China’s greatest sources of resilience is its diversiied economic structure. If drastic 
contractions occur in some parts of the economy, national social and political stability will not nec-
essarily be disrupted because other parts of the economy that remain dynamic will help to bufer 
the shocks. In other areas, however, the resilience of China’s political economy is increasingly in 
danger of weakening as a result of structural economic changes and heavy-handed political inter-
ventions. This applies in particular to the level of state and corporate debt in relation to GDP and 
GDP growth and the resultant negative efects on the iscal and inancial systems. The extremely 
rapid increase in national debt since the massive post-2007 stimulus package will seriously limit 
the government’s ability to act in the event of an acute economic or political crisis
In times of political or economic stress, decentralised policy-making by efective local author-
ities helps to compensate for blockades, political errors, or failed reforms on the part of the cen-
tral government. Yet Xi Jinping’s centralisation of policy initiative is weakening this all-important 
bufer against crises and limiting the Chinese government’s adaptive and innovative capacities. In 
efect, overcentralised decision-making abolishes the advantages of a system of distributed intel-
ligence and local initiative that Deng Xiaoping had purposefully crafted in the 1980s and 1990s.
The greatest systemic weakness in terms of the resilience of China’s government system 
is its lack of political variability and diversity. Political competition and a peaceful replacement of 
the ruling party and government are not possible in the Chinese political system. Open debates 
on the underlying shortcomings of the political system are only allowed within extremely strict 
conines, or are suppressed altogether. Critical political views, and those who spell them out, are 
much less likely to be tolerated in the inner policy-making circle of the Xi-Li administration than 
they were during previous governments. These restrictions make it more di cult to notice early 
signs of impending crises and to be able to respond to them in a timely manner, thereby increasing 
the political system’s fragility.
LOOKING INTO THE FUTURE: FOUR SCENARIOS FOR CHINA’S 
POLITICAL DEVELOPMENT
So what does the future hold for the CCP and the political system it dominates given the assort-
ment of both favourable and unfavourable conditions outlined above? The following four sce-
narios are designed to look at the scope of alternative options for development by extrapolating 
conlicting current trends and projecting them into the future. The scenarios only apply to the 
medium term, that is, the next three to ten years. 
Figure 13 illustrates the four scenarios, with the vertical axis showing the degree of decen-
tralisation and the lexibility of policy-making in three broad steps: from the return to strictly cen-
tralised policy initiative under Xi Jinping’s “top-level design” (顶层设计) to central–local interaction 
typical of Deng Xiaoping and Jiang Zemin’s reform methods (“experimentation in the shadow of 
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the party hierarchy”), all the way down to centrifugal independence – “the mountains are high and 
the Emperor is far away” (山高皇帝远) and “the higher authorities have policies, the localities 
have countermeasures” (上有政策，下有对策). 
The horizontal axis shows the changing economic conditions for political leadership over 
time, grouped in three phases: the very favourable political conditions from 1992 to 2007 when 
economic growth was rapid and there was greater room to manoeuvre in iscal terms; the gov-
ernment-driven iscal stimulus and industrial programmes between 2008 and 2012 that created 
huge levels of debt; and the considerably more di cult conditions faced by the Xi-Li administra-
tion. This government is faced with a slowdown in economic growth and a rise in state and corpo-
rate debt, coupled with increased spending on external, internal, and social security.
Scenario 1: A centralised and disciplined party and security state (the “Xi system”)
In this scenario, the key characteristic of Chinese domestic politics is a permanent concentra-
tion of power at party headquarters. Formal governing power is channelled through a network 
of Xi-headed Leading Small Groups. Efective control of a reorganised PLA and the security ap-
paratus, as well as a tightening of disciplinary control over party members, underpin Xi’s rule. The 
crackdown on corruption limits local abuses of power. 
The “Xi system” increases controllability both in state administration and with regard to its re-
pressive apparatus through the use of new technologies. If comprehensively implemented and un-
der the conditions of continuous political stress, the core executive might even turn the system into 
an IT-backed party dictatorship with certain totalitarian features such as ubiquitous surveillance.. 
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 The economy is characterised by aggressive national industrial policies, a new “going global” 
push combined with selective closure to foreign investment and recurring trade conlicts. Struc-
tural reforms help to moderate the overall growth slowdown. They also sustain efective state 
control in the inancial system and in globally competitive industries. new redistributive policies 
dampen the negative social efects of the rapid economic transition.
  The “Xi system” thrives on anti-Westernism and a high degree of ideological conformity 
in the media and the education system. A ban on independent nGOs and efective information 
management help to breed a “civilised society” under CCP guidance. An amalgam of nationalism, 
selective traditionalism, and “socialism with Chinese characteristics” form the ideological anchor 
for legitimate rule in this centralised party-state.
 Externally, Beijing’s claim to regional hegemony in East Asia is uncompromising and imple-
mented with force. Superpower rivalry with the United States leads to intensiied cyber conlicts 
and perhaps military confrontations in the Asia-Paciic region. Ambitious diplomacy together with 
new investment and inancing initiatives expand China’s political inluence globally. China’s mar-
ket and regulatory power forces multilateral institutions to adapt to Chinese policy preferences or 
face China-centred competition. By employing advanced cyber-military capabilities and leverag-
ing the global presence of Chinese IT companies, the “Xi system” also challenges U.S. dominance 
in cyberspace.
Scenario 2: A decentralised, institutionally fragile, but adaptive and lexible party-state 
(the “Deng system”)
In this scenario, the key characteristic of Chinese domestic politics is the return to an exploratory, 
experiment-based governance and reform process. Ruling power is efected through a relative-
ly decentralised and lexible approach to governance (“soft authoritarianism”). Party leadership, 
however, is curtailed by powerful, and often corrupt, political, economic and military elite net-
works. The system undergoes progressive decentralisation. This gives rise to an even stronger 
diferentiation of regional development models.
Fragmentation also characterises the “electronic reach” of the state through surveillance 
systems and media control. Censorship is unable to block lively debates in sprawling interactive 
digital media. This in turn allows the proliferation of social self-organisation and a more pluralistic 
society. As a counterbalancing factor to political and social fragmentation, nationalism becomes 
the mainstream ideology in the media and the education system.
A vibrant private sector pushes forward economic development while state interventions in 
the economy become increasingly inefective. As a result, redistribution policies fail to moderate 
growing social, regional and ethnic disparities. The social impact of SOE decline and stress in the 
inancial system also keep economic policy-making busy for the next decade. nevertheless, inter-
nationally minded interest groups forcefully push for China’s deeper integration into the global 
economy. This includes the conclusion of new trade and investment deals and further inancial 
opening which in turn create the conditions for a bumpy but sustained moderate growth path.
China’s approach to international cooperation luctuates with recurring tensions and set-
backs. Overall, the leadership’s willingness to cooperate in the Asia-Paciic region and with the 
United States prevails. Due to high costs and internal fragmentation, China’s military ambitions 
remain limited. At the same time, civilian control over the military is contested with increasing 
risks of accidental military confrontations. China’s global export machine slows and the leadership 
scales back its ambitious international inancing initiatives. China-centred diplomatic initiatives 
complement existing global multilateral governance, while Chinese contributions as an “interna-
tional stakeholder” expand in an uneven and inconsistent manner.
 
Scenario 3: “Strong man” politics supported by the security organs and nationalism 
(the “Putin system”)
Tensions inside the core executive characterise Chinese domestic politics in the “Putin system”. 
Yet, divisions at party headquarters do not prevent the concentration of power in a single lead-
ership igure whose authority is supported mainly by the security and military apparatuses. The 
party organisation remains formally in place. The most important deals and decisions, however, 
are negotiated among informal oligarchies and networks. Regions gain in informal power and co-
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ordinate only loosely with party headquarters. Institutionally, the system stagnates or even re-
gresses as the state administration is not modernised and loses its grip. As a consequence, harsh 
yet selective domestic repression substitutes for efective governing power.
Party authorities constantly attempt to reinforce political and economic order by resorting to 
nationalism and populism, but also by devoting a substantial share of the government budget to 
internal security. While political control over society remains patchy, the “strong man” and his sup-
porters iercely suppress any traces of political opposition and the development of civil society. 
The intense surveillance of digital media focuses on politically sensitive issues and is limited only 
due to inancial and organisational constraints. Regional, as well as social and ethnic, disparities 
increase rapidly and lead to recurring unrest. Religious movements beneit greatly from shallow 
regime legitimacy and a growing ideological void.
Political hardening extends to the economic sphere where the climate for domestic and inter-
national investment deteriorates sharply. Capital and entrepreneurship lees the country, resulting 
in anaemic economic growth. Increased unemployment and a rural exodus also heighten pressures 
for middle and working classes to emigrate. In the meantime, unreformed SOEs, local cadre-busi-
ness networks and the inancial system persist as rent-seeking pools for oligarchic elites.
In the international arena, the leadership distracts from domestic troubles by pouring oil onto 
regional conlicts and potentially engaging in military adventurism. All-out strategic rivalry with 
the United States not only fuels a costly arms race, it also creates a de facto state of war in the 
form of intensiied conlicts in cyberspace. With China pursuing narrowly self-interested and dis-
ruptive foreign policies, decision-making in key multilateral institutions is blocked and progress 
stalls on issues ranging from climate and trade to inancial governance.
Scenario 4: Chaotic pluralisation, a façade of democratic institutions, and informal 
oligarchies (the “Yeltsin system”)
In the fourth scenario, divisions and a power vacuum emerge at party headquarters. The CCP 
disintegrates into feuding groups at all organisational levels while ordinary CCP members spon-
taneously abandon the party. The CCP collapses, leading to a pattern of development similar to 
that during the irst ten years of post-Communist Russia under Yeltsin. Centralised power exists 
only in a symbolic sense, while strong centrifugal forces challenge state unity. Regional and na-
tional elections take place without a run-up period and without democratic, rules-based political 
competitions.
Social media provide a crucial arena for political mud-slinging and conspiracy theories that 
catalyse political polarisation and uncertainty. In an extreme case, this polarisation results in ma-
jor acts of political violence and terror. Remaining authorities in Beijing rush constitutional re-
forms and broaden the powers granted to the provinces in exchange for their support of the weak 
central government. Provincial political and military cliques grab power and undermine any sense 
of democratic legitimacy through regional elections. Informal alliances between these old power 
elites and the new economic elites not only exclude the majority of the population but also hinder 
a formally negotiated transition. Endemic corruption and organised crime become irmly ingrained 
at all levels of society.
Underneath this ruthless oligarchic and maia-like power struggle, a chaotic political plurali-
sation, a boom in social self-organisation and revived religious movements transform Chinese so-
ciety. At the same time, social, regional, and ethnic disparities intensify in an uncontrolled fashion 
and lead to recurring social and ethnic unrest as well as an exodus to neighbouring countries and 
elsewhere.
A drastic slump in economic performance is accompanied by capital light and a withdrawal 
of foreign investors. The shock waves of domestic turbulences create serious global economic 
backlash, with extremely negative short- and medium-term consequences for all of China’s eco-
nomic partners. 
The power void at the centre and ierce domestic rivalries inhibit consistent diplomacy and 
cause unpredictable security policies. A near total loss of centralised government control over the 
military weakens China’s capabilities for efective force projection. It also creates serious risks of 
maverick military actions and nuclear proliferation.
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“Moderated Xi” or “Full-blown Putin”: attributing likelihood
In the short term (2016 to 2018) the irst scenario (the “Xi system”) appears to be the most likely. 
However, there are good reasons to believe that in the medium term (2018 to 2025) the “Xi sys-
tem” will eventually have to grant signiicant concessions in terms of economic policy to subna-
tional governments as a result of a failure to implement the promised economic structural reforms 
and/or due to a sustained deceleration in the growth rate.
In this moderated form, the “Xi system” is still likely to retain its centralised character with re-
spect to political control, public security, technical surveillance systems, and foreign, security, and 
military policies. However, in the ield of economic regulation, lessons from the exploratory and 
lexible reform methods under the “Deng system” from 1978 to 2008 have shown that overly cen-
tralised control of economic policy results in a decline in local initiative. Therefore, reform methods 
of the “Deng system” are likely to once again gain traction in the medium term, moderating the 
overly rigid “Xi system”. 
The more disruptive scenarios 3 and 4, triggered by a clear split occurring within the party 
leadership or a more complete disintegration of the CCP, appear less likely, but are certainly within 
the realms of possibility. The fundamental risk of systemic collapse is higher in China’s party-state 
than it is in systems that are characterised by regularised and democratic government turnover. 
Authoritarian systems of government that base their legitimacy primarily on economic success 
are particularly vulnerable to abrupt political disintegration in the event of a slump: economic cri-
ses will quickly reveal the fragile foundations on which political legitimacy is based, the unreliable 
support for the current regime among the political and economic elite and the general public, and 
especially the lack of regular mechanisms to appoint a new legitimate government.
The medium-term future of the political system will depend on the extent to which the par-
ty leadership under Xi Jinping is able to reverse the internal symptoms of decline within the CCP 
and to consolidate a continuation of the current polity. Attempts to bring about an economic 
rebalancing must not be allowed to fail if long-term political decay is to be avoided. The Chinese 
party leadership will need a great deal of skill to implement its economic policy and also a certain 
amount of luck regarding the international economic environment so that any external shocks 
that might hit the country will not be too debilitating while it is still in the midst of its restructur-
ing process. Should Xi Jinping’s agenda to revitalise party rule and to restructure the economy by 
2020 visibly fail, and social and political tensions become exacerbated, the collapse of the entire 
system will be a deinite possibility.
Whatever scenario ultimately plays out, one path of China’s political development has been 
quite unambiguously taken of the table for the foreseeable future: the gradual evolution to-
wards the Western model of a democratic constitutional state. The evolutionary perspective of a 
peaceful, controlled, and negotiated transition from CCP rule to a pluralistic democracy currently 
enjoys no support. The political leadership under Xi Jinping has consistently shown that it is inter-
ested only in strengthening and modernising the party-state. Under no circumstances is it inter-
ested in starting down a path toward democratisation in the Western sense of the word. There is 
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